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REFINING PER SE UNFAIR TRADE 
PRACTICES* 
MATTHEW W. SAWCHAK** 
 
North Carolina’s “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” statute, 
section 75-1.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes, is a central 
feature of North Carolina litigation. The statute allows lucrative 
remedies, but it defines prohibited conduct with only vague 
standards. Courts have difficulty applying these standards in any 
detail, so they often use analytical shortcuts in decisions under 
the statute. 
One key shortcut under section 75-1.1 is the “per se violation.” A 
per se violation arises when actions that violate a source of law 
outside section 75-1.1—a different statute, a regulation, or a 
nonstatutory doctrine—automatically violate section 75-1.1 as 
well. A per se violation has a transformative effect: in one stroke, 
it turns a claim for single damages into a claim for treble 
damages and possible attorney fees. 
Courts in section 75-1.1 cases have struggled to decide when to 
carry out, and when to refuse, this transformation. They have 
accepted and rejected per se theories with no explanation or with 
question-begging explanations. They have also sidestepped the 
problems with a per se theory by applying a number of 
variations on per se theories. This variety of approaches leaves 
courts and lawyers to guess at what analysis to apply in future 
cases. 
The courts can end this confusion by sharpening the per se 
theory and replacing parts of it. In many instances, the General 
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Assembly has announced, directly or indirectly, that a violation 
of a given statute is also a violation of section 75-1.1. Courts 
should continue to apply these per se violations. In all other 
cases, however, courts should ask whether the conduct that 
makes up a separate violation satisfies the tests for unfairness 
under section 75-1.1. The tests for unfairness already address 
violations of separate statutes and other expressions of public 
policy. This streamlined approach will strengthen the analysis of 
per se and non-per-se violations alike. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Section 75-1.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes is a 
prominent feature of North Carolina litigation. The statute condemns 
an undefined category of conduct: “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.”1 A claim under section 75-1.1 is “a boilerplate claim in 
most every complaint based on a commercial or consumer transaction 
in North Carolina.”2 
Two factors make section 75-1.1 claims so common. First, a 
violation of the statute triggers powerful remedies: automatic treble 
damages, plus an opportunity to recover attorney fees.3 Second, the 
definition of conduct that violates section 75-1.1 is so vague that 
 
 1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (2013). This Article refers to this statute as “section 
75-1.1.” This phrasing mirrors the phrasing in recent North Carolina appellate opinions. 
See, e.g., Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 367 N.C. 81, 747 S.E.2d 220 (2013). 
  The title of this Article uses the phrase “unfair trade practices” because lawyers 
and judges recognize this phrase most readily. See GE Betz, Inc. v. Conrad, __ N.C. App. 
__, __, 752 S.E.2d 634, 650 n.6 (2013) (noting that the phrase “unfair or deceptive trade 
practices” still “remains common in legal parlance today”), petition for disc. rev. filed, No. 
111P10-2 (N.C. Jan. 7, 2014); NOEL L. ALLEN, NORTH CAROLINA UNFAIR BUSINESS 
PRACTICE § 1.01, at 1-1 (3d ed. 2014) (making a similar point). 
 2. Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 347 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Allied Distribs., Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 847 F. Supp. 376, 379 (E.D.N.C. 
1993)). 
 3. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-16, -16.1. 
  For other statutes that allow automatic treble damages, see, for example, Clayton 
Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) 
Act § 4(c), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75D-8(c) (North Carolina’s RICO 
statute). 
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unless a categorical exemption applies, there is almost always a 
credible prospect that a claim will succeed.4 
Because the conduct standard under section 75-1.1 is vague, 
courts struggle to apply the statute consistently and to explain their 
decisions.5 Courts often avoid these struggles by applying judicially 
created exemptions or other analytical shortcuts.6 
A key type of shortcut under section 75-1.1 is the “per se 
violation.” A per se violation occurs when actions that violate a 
standard outside section 75-1.1—a separate statute, a regulation, or a 
common-law doctrine—automatically violate section 75-1.1 as well.7  
A per se theory has a powerful effect: it turns a claim that offers 
only single damages into a claim that offers treble damages and 
possible attorney fees.8 Indeed, a per se theory can produce these 
 
 4. See, e.g., Matthew W. Sawchak & Kip D. Nelson, Defining Unfairness in “Unfair 
Trade Practices,” 90 N.C. L. REV. 2033, 2043–50 (2012) (discussing the standards for 
violations of section 75-1.1). 
 5. See, e.g., id. at 2051–54; see also Thomas A. Farr, Unfair and Deceptive Legislation: 
The Case for Finding North Carolina General Statutes Section 75-1.1 Unconstitutionally 
Vague as Applied to an Alleged Breach of a Commercial Contract, 8 CAMPBELL L. REV. 
421, 426–32 (1986) (describing the unpredictable application of section 75-1.1 and arguing 
that, at least in non-consumer cases, the statute is unconstitutionally vague). 
 6. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 362, 396 
(M.D.N.C. 2002) (holding that the failure of federal antitrust claims defeated a section 75-
1.1 claim “for essentially the same reasons”), aff’d mem., 67 F. App’x 810 (4th Cir. 2003); 
White v. Thompson, 364 N.C. 47, 53, 691 S.E.2d 676, 680 (2010) (holding that section 75-
1.1 does not apply to a business’s internal operations); Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 
2053–56 (noting these and other analytical shortcuts). 
 7. Per se violations of section 75-1.1 resemble cases of negligence per se in tort law. 
Negligence per se allows a statute or regulation to become a standard that creates liability 
for negligence, whether or not the predicate violation itself would otherwise create civil 
liability. See, e.g., Baldwin v. GTE S., Inc., 335 N.C. 544, 546, 439 S.E.2d 108, 109 (1994) 
(stating the North Carolina standard for negligence per se). See generally Robert F. 
Blomquist, The Trouble with Negligence Per Se, 61 S.C. L. REV. 221 (2009) (laying out the 
disorderly state of the doctrine of negligence per se and proposing partial solutions). 
  In antitrust law, in contrast, a per se theory does not involve the relationship 
between a separate source of law and antitrust doctrine. Instead, it is a streamlined way of 
applying antitrust doctrine itself. A per se rule treats certain “categories of restraints as 
necessarily illegal, eliminat[ing] the need to study the reasonableness of an individual 
restraint in light of the real market forces at work.” Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007). But cf. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 
CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW DEVELOPMENTS 376 & n.7 (2009) (using the term “per 
se” to refer to specific lists of prohibited conduct in statutes similar to section 75-1.1); John 
F. Graybeal, Unfair Trade Practices, Antitrust and Consumer Welfare in North Carolina, 80 
N.C. L. REV. 1927, 1956–57 (2002) (discussing the occasional role of section 75-1.1 as an 
antitrust statute). 
 8. See, e.g., Kettle v. Leonard, No. 7:11-CV-189-BR, 2012 WL 4086595, at *12 
(E.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 2012) (treating a fraud claim as a per se violation of section 75-1.1 and 
awarding treble damages as a result); Trantham v. Michael L. Martin, Inc., __ N.C. App. 
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remedies even when an underlying violation allows no private 
recovery at all.9 
Although per se violations of section 75-1.1 have existed for 
almost forty years,10 courts have not developed reliable standards to 
decide when per se violations will and will not arise.11 In one recent 
decision, for example, the North Carolina Court of Appeals stated 
that courts recognize per se violations “only where the regulatory 
 
__, __, 745 S.E.2d 327, 335 (2013) (doing the same with claims for fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation). 
 9. See, e.g., Guessford v. Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 652, 660 
(M.D.N.C. 2013) (noting that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-15(11) creates no private right of 
action, but then stating: “[I]f Plaintiff can prove that Defendant acted in a way that 
violated § 58-63-15(11) . . . then Plaintiff will be able to establish his [section 75-1.1] claim 
and thereby may seek treble damages arising from the alleged [section 75-1.1] violation”). 
 10. See Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 309, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975) (“Proof of fraud 
would necessarily constitute a violation of the prohibition against unfair and deceptive 
acts . . . .”). 
 11. See infra notes 44–81, 139–63 and accompanying text (analyzing the case law on 
per se violations). 
  Likewise, the nationwide literature on statutes like section 75-1.1 does not analyze 
standards for per se violations in depth. See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 
supra note 7, at 376 (describing explicit per se provisions in some states’ statutes); 
ANTITRUST & UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW SEC., STATE BAR OF CAL., CALIFORNIA 
ANTITRUST AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW § 16.04[B], at 16-19 to -22 (Cheryl Lee 
Johnson ed., rev. ed. 2013) (discussing which federal and California statutes can be 
“predicate acts” that establish a violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law); 
CAROLYN L. CARTER & JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND 
PRACTICES §§ 3.2.7.3 to .4 (8th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2013) (discussing potential sources of per 
se violations, but not standards for creating or rejecting per se violations); MICHAEL C. 
GILLERAN, THE LAW OF CHAPTER 93A § 4.14 (2d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2013) (volume 52 in 
MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES) (discussing standards for per se violations under the 
Massachusetts statute); J. CLARK KELSO, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES LITIGATION (1995) 
(containing no discussion of per se violations); ROBERT M. LANGER ET AL., 
CONNECTICUT UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES, BUSINESS TORTS AND ANTITRUST § 2.8, at 
87–94 (2013-2014 ed.) (volume 12 in CONNECTICUT PRACTICE SERIES) (describing cases 
in which courts have recognized other violations as per se violations of the Connecticut 
Unfair Trade Practices Act); 1 DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER 
PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 3:27, at 156–66 (2013-2014 ed.) (listing instances in which 
violations of state or federal statutes have established per se violations of a statute like 
section 75-1.1); Mark S. Fistos, Per Se Violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade 
Practices Act, 76 FLA. B.J. 62, 62–64 (2002) (discussing standards for per se violations of 
the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act); James A. McKenna, Consumer 
Protection and the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 9 ME. B.J. 78, 80 (1994) (listing specific 
statutes that constitute “per se and prima facie evidence” violations of the Maine Unfair 
Trade Practices Act); Jonathan A. Mark, Comment, Dispensing with the Public Interest 
Requirement in Private Causes of Action Under the Washington Consumer Protection Act, 
29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 205, 212–13 (2005) (discussing contradictory holdings on the test 
for a per se violation of Washington’s statute like section 75-1.1); Joseph Thomas 
Moldovan, Comment, New York Creates a Private Right of Action to Combat Consumer 
Fraud: Caveat Venditor, 48 BROOK. L. REV. 509, 560–61 (1982) (arguing that New York 
courts should recognize per se violations of New York’s statute). 
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statute [that creates the underlying violation] specifically defines and 
proscribes conduct which is unfair or deceptive within the meaning of 
[section] 75-1.1.”12 If one could identify “conduct which is unfair or 
deceptive” as easily as this passage assumes, there would be little 
need for per se violations. Unclear standards like these have 
produced muddled doctrine.13 
In part because of the underdeveloped standards for per se 
violations, courts have improvised a number of variations on per se 
theories—approaches that give some weight to other violations, but 
do not treat them as automatic violations of section 75-1.1. The case 
law reveals at least four of these variations.14 Courts have not 
explained why these approaches exist. Nor have they explained when 
each approach applies. 
This Article proposes that courts end this chaos by sharpening 
the per se theory and replacing parts of it with better-established 
doctrine. 
In many statutes, the North Carolina General Assembly has 
announced expressly, or almost expressly, that a violation of a given 
statute is a violation of section 75-1.1.15 Courts should continue to 
treat these statutes as sources of per se violations. In the absence of 
such a statement by the legislature, however, courts should not apply 
a per se analysis or any of its variants. Instead, courts should ask 
whether the conduct that makes up a separate violation satisfies, on a 
non-per-se basis, the test for unfairness under section 75-1.1.16 
 
 12. Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), LLC, 199 N.C. App. 163, 170, 681 S.E.2d 
448, 454 (2009) (emphasis deleted). 
  Although this language might imply that the court of appeals was requiring an 
explicit cross-reference to section 75-1.1, the rest of the decision shows that the court was 
not. See id. at 170 n.3, 171, 681 S.E.2d at 454 n.3, 455 (treating statutes without any explicit 
cross-reference to section 75-1.1 as ones that met the court’s “specifically define and 
proscribe” test). 
 13. See, e.g., In re Fifth Third Bank, Nat’l Ass’n—Vill. of Penland Litig., 217 N.C. 
App. 199, 207, 719 S.E.2d 171, 176 (2011) (“[A] violation of a consumer protection statute 
may, in some instances, constitute a per se violation of [section 75-1.1].” (emphasis added 
and deleted)); Battleground Veterinary Hosp., P.C. v. McGeough, No. 05 CVS 18918, 
2007 WL 3071618, at *8 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Oct. 19, 2007) (“[P]roof of an independent tort 
generally is sufficient to make out a separate [section 75-1.1] claim.” (emphasis added)). 
 14. See infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text. 
 15. See ALLEN, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-8 n.22 (listing statutes with explicit cross-
references to section 75-1.1). 
 16. That test provides, in relevant part, that “[a] practice is unfair when it offends 
established public policy.” E.g., Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 72, 
653 S.E.2d 393, 399 (2007) (quoting Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 548, 276 S.E.2d 397, 
403 (1981)). 
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Sources that define unfairness show how to analyze violations of 
separate statutes, regulations, and other expressions of public policy.17 
This streamlined analysis will give courts, lawyers, and clients a 
consistent way to decide how violations of other sources of law affect 
claims under section 75-1.1. It will also give the General Assembly an 
incentive to create per se violations expressly when it intends them. 
Finally, by unifying the case law on per se violations with the case law 
on public-policy-based violations of section 75-1.1, the proposed 
analysis will help courts refine both theories under the statute. 
Part I of this Article gives an overview of section 75-1.1, its 
history, and litigation under the statute. Part II describes the current 
doctrine on per se violations of section 75-1.1. Part III discusses the 
problems with the current standards for per se violations and related 
theories. Part IV proposes solutions to these problems. Specifically, it 
proposes that courts refocus the per se doctrine on legislatively 
declared violations and replace the remaining theories in this area 
with parts of the unfairness doctrine. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF SECTION 75-1.1 
Section 75-1.1 provides that “[u]nfair methods of competition in 
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.”18 The North Carolina 
General Assembly enacted section 75-1.1 in 1969.19 The statute was 
part of a nationwide wave of consumer-protection measures that 
states enacted in the 1960s and early 1970s, partly at the 
encouragement of the Federal Trade Commission.20 
One mark of the FTC’s role in promoting section 75-1.1 is the 
text of the statute, which mirrors the text of section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act.21 Because of this parallel statutory language, 
 
 17. See infra notes 221–34 and accompanying text. 
 18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (2013). 
 19. Act of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, § 1(b), 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930, 930 (codified at 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (2013)). 
 20. See, e.g., Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 543, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1981); ABA 
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 7, at 375; Graybeal, supra note 7, at 1933–34; 
William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724, 730 
(1972). 
 21. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (“Unfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are 
declared unlawful.”), with 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (“Unfair methods of competition in 
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, 
are hereby declared unlawful.”). See generally Robert Morgan, The People’s Advocate in 
the Marketplace—The Role of the North Carolina Attorney General in the Field of 
Consumer Protection, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRAMURAL L. REV. 1, 18–20 (1969) (discussing 
CITE AS 92 N.C. L. REV. 1881 (2014) 
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North Carolina courts have said that in section 75-1.1 cases, they take 
guidance from authorities under section 5.22 
A section 75-1.1 claim offers lucrative private remedies. 
Successful claims under the statute generate mandatory treble 
damages.23 In addition, a prevailing plaintiff can recover attorney fees 
if she proves that the defendant violated the statute willfully and 
committed an “unwarranted refusal . . . to fully resolve the matter 
which constitutes the basis of” a section 75-1.1 lawsuit.24 
Unsurprisingly, claims under the statute have generated large verdicts 
and settlements.25 
Section 75-1.1 combines these lucrative remedies with a vague 
test for liability. Unlike parallel statutes in most other states,26 section 
75-1.1 does not contain a list of specifically prohibited business 
practices. Instead, the courts have used broadly worded tests to assess 
liability under the statute. According to the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina, “[a] practice is unfair when it offends established public 
policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, 
unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers. [A] practice is 
deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive.”27 
 
the history of the enactment of section 75-1.1, including the intentional decision to follow 
the language of section 5). 
  Given the close relationship between section 5 and state statutes like section 75-
1.1, this Article uses the term “section 5 analogues” to describe state statutes that 
condemn unfair and deceptive acts and practices (including but not limited to statutes with 
a text that mirrors section 5). See, e.g., PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 11, § 2:10, at 
41–43 (describing the multiple forms of section 5 analogues). 
 22. See, e.g., Henderson v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 346 N.C. 741, 749, 488 S.E.2d 234, 
239 (1997) (stating that section 75-1.1 “is patterned after section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, and we look to federal case law for guidance in interpreting the statute” 
(citation omitted)); see also Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 2064–65 (discussing other 
decisions to the same effect). 
 23. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16; Bhatti v. Buckland, 328 N.C. 240, 243, 400 S.E.2d 
440, 442 (1991) (“If a violation of Chapter 75 is found, treble damages must be awarded.”). 
 24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.1(1). Section 75-16.1 also allows reverse fee shifting if 
“[t]he party instituting the action knew, or should have known, the action was frivolous 
and malicious.” Id. § 75-16.1(2). Reverse fee awards under section 75-16.1, however, are 
relatively rare. See ALLEN, supra note 1, § 11.10, at 11-35 to -42. 
 25. See, e.g., Large Verdicts & Settlements, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 31, 2011, at 8 
(reporting a $10.1 million arbitration award on a counterclaim for “unfair/deceptive trade 
practices”); Top Verdicts & Settlements, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Feb. 6, 2012, at 9 (reporting an 
$8.7 million verdict for “unfair and deceptive trade practices”). 
 26. See, e.g., PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 11, app. 3B, at 174–76 (listing thirty-
eight states and territories whose section 5 analogues include a list—in most cases, a 
nonexclusive list—of prohibited acts). 
 27. Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 72, 653 S.E.2d 393, 399 
(2007) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Marshall v. Miller, 302 
N.C. 539, 548, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981)). As noted below, there are also three other 
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The case law under section 75-1.1 reflects the open-ended nature 
of these tests. For example, North Carolina courts have declined to 
limit the statute to consumer claims or to buyer-seller relationships.28 
A section 75-1.1 plaintiff, moreover, can prevail without showing a 
defendant’s bad faith, intent, willfulness, or knowledge.29 Further, a 
plaintiff’s contributory negligence is no defense to a claim under the 
statute.30 As these examples suggest, the conduct standard under 
section 75-1.1 is so broad that unless a categorical exemption applies, 
there is almost always a credible prospect that a section 75-1.1 claim 
will succeed.31 
In view of the lucrative remedies and vague standards for claims 
under section 75-1.1, it should be no surprise that North Carolina 
lawyers include a section 75-1.1 claim in almost every lawsuit that 
involves business conduct.32 Indeed, “[i]n modern business litigation 
 
types of section 75-1.1 claims: (1) claims for unfair methods of competition, (2) claims 
based on “aggravated” breaches of contracts, and (3) claims for per se violations of section 
75-1.1. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 28. See, e.g., United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 665, 370 S.E.2d 375, 389 
(1988). 
 29. See, e.g., Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 544, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400–01 (1981). 
 30. See, e.g., Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 95–96, 331 S.E.2d 677, 
680–81 (1985); cf. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 
(M.D.N.C. 1996) (rejecting, on the facts, the defenses of unclean hands and in pari 
delicto), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 31. To be sure, not every claim that has a prospect of success prevails in the end. For 
example, in a recent case, a section 75-1.1 claim prevailed in the trial court and in the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals, but was rejected in the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina. Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 367 N.C. 81, 92, 747 S.E.2d 220, 229 (2013), 
rev’g 215 N.C. App. 307, 718 S.E.2d 408 (2011). 
 32. See ALLEN, supra note 1, § 1.02, at 1-2 to -5 (commenting on the widespread 
assertion of section 75-1.1 claims); Mack Sperling, The Business Court Takes a Narrow 
View of When Claims Are “In or Affecting Commerce” Under Chapter 75 of the General 
Statutes, N.C. BUS. LITIG. REP. (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.ncbusinesslitigationreport.com 
/2014/01/articles/watching-the-court/the-business-court-takes-a-narrow-view-of-when-
claims-are-in-or-affecting-commerce-under-chapter-75-of-the-general-statutes (same). 
Indeed, courts have commented with disfavor on the ubiquity of section 75-1.1 claims. See, 
e.g., Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 347 (4th Cir. 1998); 
Veolia Water Solutions & Techs. Support v. Siemens Indus., No. 5:11-CV-296-FL, 2012 
WL 4793472, at *2 n.2 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 9, 2012); Allied Distribs., Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing 
Co., 847 F. Supp. 376, 379 (E.D.N.C. 1993). 
  This pattern is not limited to North Carolina. Across the country, the number of 
claims under section 5 analogues more than doubled between 2000 and 2007. SEARLE 
CIVIL JUSTICE INST., STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS: AN EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATION OF PRIVATE LITIGATION: PRELIMINARY REPORT, at xii, 19 (2009). A 
recent study found that states (like North Carolina) with vague definitions of prohibited 
conduct have more lawsuits—or at least more reported decisions—under their section 5 
analogues than states with more clearly defined proscriptions have. Id. at 26. 
  Lawsuits under section 5 analogues, especially putative class actions under these 
statutes, have grown increasingly controversial in recent years. This controversy has 
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in North Carolina, it is increasingly rare to see a complaint that does 
not contain a claim under” section 75-1.1.33 Over its forty-five-year 
history, the statute has generated over 2000 reported decisions,34 to 
say nothing of unreported decisions. 
As section 75-1.1 claims have multiplied, several categories of 
these claims have emerged. One can divide section 75-1.1 claims into 
the following categories: 
 
• claims for per se violations of section 75-1.1; 
 
•  claims of unfair methods of competition, which involve 
alleged harm to the competitive process; 
 
•  claims of deceptive conduct; 
 
•  claims of aggravated breaches of contract; and 
 
•  claims of unfair conduct alone.35 
 
This Article focuses on per se violations of section 75-1.1. The 
next part of this Article describes per se violations and related 
theories in detail. 
 
sparked proposals for state legislatures to narrow the scope of section 5 analogues. See, 
e.g., JOANNA SHEPHERD-BAILEY, CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS OR CONSUMER 
LITIGATION ACTS?: A HISTORICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF STATE CPAs 26–
27 (2014), available at http://atra.org/sites/default/files/documents/Shepherd-Bailey%20 
White%20Paper%20-%20FINAL_0.pdf (praising recent legislation that narrowed 
Tennessee’s section 5 analogue and suggesting that other states adopt similar—and 
further—amendments); Dee Pridgen, Wrecking Ball Disguised as Reform: ALEC’s Model 
Act on Private Enforcement of Consumer Protection Statutes, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE (forthcoming Apr. 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2426381 (describing, and criticizing, legislation proposed by the American 
Legislative Exchange Council). 
 33. John Buford, Supreme Court Rejects Chapter 75 Claim Between Partners, N.C. 
BUS. LITIG. REP. (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.ncbusinesslitigationreport.com/ 
2010/04/articles/fiduciary-duty/supreme-court-rejects-chapter-75-claim-between-partners 
(emphasis added); accord Sperling, supra note 32 (“[T]here is not much doubt about why 
[section 75-1.1 claims] are included in almost every Complaint in the [North Carolina 
Business] Court. The prospect of treble damages (per G.S. § 75-16) and attorneys’ fees 
(per G.S. § 75-16.1) is too tempting for many to pass up.”). 
 34. ALLEN, supra note 1, § 1.01, at 1-2. To analyze ongoing developments under 
section 75-1.1, my colleagues and I recently launched a blog on the law under the statute. 
See WHAT’S FAIR?: A BLOG ON THE LAW OF UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE 
PRACTICES, http://www.unfairtradepracticesnc.com/. 
 35. See Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 2050–56 (giving a detailed overview of 
these types of claims). 
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II.  PER SE VIOLATIONS AND RELATED THEORIES 
When one analyzes a section 75-1.1 claim, the most difficult 
question is usually whether the facts satisfy the conduct standard 
under the statute.36 Instead of addressing this conduct standard 
directly, a party can bypass it by pursuing a per se theory. A per se 
violation of section 75-1.1 occurs when a violation of another source 
of law—a different statute, a regulation, or a nonstatutory duty—
automatically satisfies the conduct standard for a section 75-1.1 
claim.37 
For brevity, one can use the term “upgrading” to describe 
converting a violation of another source of law to a violation of 
section 75-1.1. One can call the violation of another source of law a 
“predicate violation.” The other source of law can be called a 
“predicate statute,” a “predicate regulation,” or the like. 
Per se theories are important because of their decisive effect. 
Under a per se theory, a plaintiff can show a violation of section 75-
1.1 just by proving that a predicate violation has occurred.38 In 
addition, once a court recognizes a given predicate violation as a per 
se violation of section 75-1.1, that conclusion usually carries over to 
all future instances of that predicate violation.39 
The first per se case under section 75-1.1, Hardy v. Toler,40 was 
decided six years after the statute was enacted. The Supreme Court of 
North Carolina wrote: “Proof of fraud would necessarily constitute a 
 
 36. See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 1, § 1.01, at 1-2 (“The broad wording of the statute 
invites a quasi-constitutional form of case analysis. The courts have . . . [stated] that the 
law is necessarily comprehensive and subject to case-by-case interpretation.”); supra notes 
26–31 and accompanying text (describing the open-ended conduct standard under section 
75-1.1). 
 37. See, e.g., CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 11, § 3.2, at 178 (giving a similar 
definition); Fistos, supra note 11, at 62–63 (same). 
 38. See, e.g., State ex rel. Edmisten v. Zim Chem. Co., 45 N.C. App. 604, 607, 263 
S.E.2d 849, 851 (1980) (“Upon application of [N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-571] to the facts in 
this case, we find that defendant’s failure to properly label the drums of antifreeze 
constitutes a misbranding [in violation of section 106-571]. . . . We think, therefore, and so 
hold that defendant’s misbranding of the antifreeze, which is undisputed, is a deceptive 
practice within the meaning of [section] 75-1.1 as a matter of law.”). 
 39. See, e.g., Kettle v. Leonard, No. 7:11-CV-189-BR, 2012 WL 4086595, at *12 
(E.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 2012) (“[P]roof of fraud, either actual or constructive, is sufficient, in 
and of itself, to prove a violation of [section 75-1.1].” (citing Jones v. Harrelson & Smith 
Contractors, LLC, 194 N.C. App. 203, 217, 670 S.E.2d 242, 252 (2008), aff’d, 363 N.C. 371, 
677 S.E.2d 453 (2009))). But cf. Keister v. Nat’l Council of the Young Men’s Christian 
Ass’n of the U.S., No. 12 CVS 1137, 2013 WL 3864583, at *3 (N.C. Bus. Ct. July 18, 2013) 
(“Fraud or misrepresentation occurring during a commercial transaction is not a per se 
violation of Chapter 75, but such conduct can be the basis of a claim under Chapter 75.”). 
 40. 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975). 
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violation of the prohibition against unfair and deceptive acts . . . .”41 
Applying this rule, the court moved directly from the conclusion that 
the defendants had committed fraud to the conclusion that they had 
violated section 75-1.1.42 
Hardy illustrates one pattern of upgrading: selective upgrading. 
In selective upgrading, the source of law for a predicate violation does 
not expressly refer to section 75-1.1, but courts nonetheless upgrade 
the predicate violation.43 
Subsection A below outlines the existing patterns of upgrading 
(selective and otherwise) under North Carolina law. Subsection B 
identifies variations on per se analysis that have taken root in North 
Carolina cases. 
A. Patterns of Upgrading Under Section 75-1.1 
North Carolina decisions recognize a per se violation of section 
75-1.1 in three different patterns of reasoning: 
 
•  Explicit upgrading, when the source of law for a predicate 
violation expressly states that a violation of that source of law 
is also a violation of section 75-1.1; 
 
•  Semi-explicit upgrading, when the source of law simply 
describes conduct as unfair or deceptive; and 
 
•  Selective upgrading, when the source of law does not meet 
either of the above tests, but the court nonetheless upgrades 
the predicate violation. 
 
This subsection describes these three patterns in turn. It then 
discusses a decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina that cuts 
through these patterns and announces a discrete limit on upgrading. 
 
 41. Id. at 309, 218 S.E.2d at 346 (emphasis added). 
 42. The court went on to state: “[W]e hold as a matter of law that the false 
representations made by defendants to plaintiff constituted unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in commerce contrary to the provisions of [section] 75-1.1 . . . .” Id. at 311, 218 
S.E.2d at 347. The court in Hardy otherwise used the phrase “as a matter of law” to state 
that a judge, rather than a jury, decides liability under section 75-1.1. See id. at 309–11, 218 
S.E.2d at 346–47. This dual meaning of “as a matter of law” has caused confusion in later 
cases. See infra notes 164–85 and accompanying text. 
 43. See, e.g., Hardy, 288 N.C. at 309–10, 213 S.E.2d at 346 (upgrading fraud to a 
section 75-1.1 violation by following, without further elaboration, D.D.D. Corp. v. FTC, 
125 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1942)); infra notes 52–56, 139–63 and accompanying text 
(discussing selective upgrading and problems with it). 
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1.  Explicit Upgrading 
Explicit upgrading occurs when the source of law for a predicate 
violation specifically refers to section 75-1.1. For example, North 
Carolina’s state trademark statute provides that infringement or 
fraudulent registration of a state-law trademark “constitutes a 
violation of G.S. 75-1.1.”44 About forty-five North Carolina statutes 
contain similar cross-references.45 When a source of law contains an 
explicit cross-reference to section 75-1.1, courts recognize per se 
violations of section 75-1.1 without difficulty.46 
 
 44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 80-12 (2013). 
 45. See ALLEN, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-8 n.22 (listing these statutes); id. §§ 3.01 to 
.06, at 3-1 to -31 (describing many of these statutes and related case law). 
  Explicit upgrading plays an even greater role in Texas, where the section 5 
analogue limits per se theories to instances of explicit upgrading. See TEX. BUS. & COM. 
CODE ANN. § 17.43 (West 2011) (“A violation of a provision of law other than this 
subchapter is not in and of itself a violation of this subchapter. An act or practice that is a 
violation of a provision of law other than this subchapter may be made the basis of an 
action under this subchapter if the act or practice is proscribed by a provision of this 
subchapter or is declared by such other law to be actionable under this subchapter.”). 
  Although North Carolina has no limiting provision like the one in the Texas 
statute, North Carolina courts have sometimes reached equivalent results through 
statutory interpretation. They have reasoned that when the legislature refers to section 75-
1.1 in certain statutes but not others, it implicitly disapproves upgrading violations of the 
statutes without the cross-references. See, e.g., Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 192 N.C. App. 
298, 318, 665 S.E.2d 767, 780 (2008); see also Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 
243 F.3d 789, 804–05 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying the same analysis to predicate federal 
statutes). But see Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper Servs., Inc., 108 N.C. App. 
169, 172, 423 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1992) (“[T]he fact that the Trade Secrets Protection Act was 
not one of the regulatory statutes specifically listed in Chapter 66 as violative of [section] 
75-1.1 is immaterial. This Court has repeatedly held that the violation of regulatory 
statutes which govern business activities may also be a violation of [section] 75-1.1 whether 
or not such activities are listed specifically in the regulatory act as a violation of [section] 
75-1.1.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Oset v. Interstate Brokerage of the Se., Inc., No. 5:99-CV-185-BO(2), 
1999 WL 33236225, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 30, 1999) (“Since the Court has already found 
that Defendant violated [North Carolina’s Business Opportunity Sales Act], and N.C.G.S. 
§ 66-100 of [that Act] provides that ‘[t]he violation of any provisions of this Article shall 
constitute an unfair practice under G.S. § 75-1.1,’ it follows that this Court must find that 
Defendant violated N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 . . . .” (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-100(e))), aff’d 
per curiam, No. 00-1029, 2000 WL 1853332, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 19, 2000); Ferrmily Corp. 
v. Amodeo, No. 01 CVS 12596, 2002 WL 34192854, at *2 (Wake Cnty., N.C. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 23, 2002) (upgrading a violation of the North Carolina trademark statutes, relying on 
the explicit cross-reference to section 75-1.1 in those statutes); cf. Llera v. Sec. Credit Sys., 
Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 674, 677 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (treating a claim under N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 58-70-130(c), which explicitly refers to section 75-1.1, as an implicit claim under section 
75-1.1). 
  For one major predicate statute, the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act, 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to -157, some decisions have applied explicit upgrading 
mistakenly. They have done so by citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-146, an explicit-upgrading 
provision in a neighboring, but unrelated statute. See, e.g., Med. Staffing Network, Inc. v. 
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2.  Semi-Explicit Upgrading 
Semi-explicit upgrading occurs when the source of law for a 
predicate violation does not refer to section 75-1.1, but calls certain 
conduct unfair or deceptive. 
To date, the only successful instance of semi-explicit upgrading in 
North Carolina involves N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-63-15(1), which bans 
false and misleading statements about the terms of insurance 
policies.47 In Jefferson-Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Spencer,48 the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina stated: “[A] violation of [section] 
58-63-15(1) is an unfair and deceptive practice under [section] 75-
1.1.”49 
When a court, like the court in Jefferson-Pilot, writes that a 
predicate statute that says “unfair or deceptive” is a per se violation 
of section 75-1.1, the court appears to be stating one or both of two 
conclusions. First, the court might be concluding that the legislature 
has announced a section 75-1.1 violation explicitly, but without citing 
 
Ridgway, 194 N.C. App. 649, 659–60, 670 S.E.2d 321, 329 (2009) (committing this error); 
Akzo Nobel Coatings Inc. v. Rogers, No. 11 CVS 3013, 2011 WL 5316772, at *23 (N.C. 
Bus. Ct. Nov. 3, 2011) (same); see also Awarepoint Corp. v. Noel, No. 11 CVS 19136, 2012 
WL 2603309, ¶ 23 n.1 (N.C. Bus. Ct. May 14, 2012) (pointing out this error in the above 
decisions). 
 47. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-15(1) (stating, without literally referring to section 
75-1.1, that misrepresentations of the terms of insurance policies “are hereby defined as 
unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts or practices”). 
  In a case that involved mobile-home regulations, the North Carolina courts nearly 
applied semi-explicit upgrading again, but ultimately refused. The North Carolina Court 
of Appeals applied semi-explicit upgrading, but the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
reversed that part of the decision. See Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 176 N.C. 
App. 668, 672, 627 S.E.2d 629, 632 (2006), aff’d in part and modified in part, 362 N.C. 63, 
71–72, 653 S.E.2d 393, 399 (2007); see also infra notes 58–80, 252–57 and accompanying 
text (discussing these aspects of Walker). 
 48. 336 N.C. 49, 442 S.E.2d 316 (1994). 
 49. Id. at 53, 442 S.E.2d at 318 (emphasis added) (attributing this rule to Pearce v. 
Am. Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 343 S.E.2d 174 (1986)). 
  In Pearce, the supreme court had held that a violation of the predecessor of 
section 58-63-15(1) “as a matter of law constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice in 
violation of [section] 75-1.1.” Pearce, 316 N.C. at 470, 343 S.E.2d at 179. For additional 
decisions that upgrade violations of section 58-63-15(1) or its predecessor, see FSI v. 
Newson, No. COA13-222, 2013 WL 5947132, at *6 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2013) 
(unpublished); Cullen v. Valley Forge Life Ins. Co., 161 N.C. App. 570, 579, 589 S.E.2d 
423, 431 (2003); Kron Med. Corp. v. Collier Cobb & Assocs., Inc., 107 N.C. App. 331, 335, 
341, 420 S.E.2d 192, 194, 197–98 (1992). 
  In contrast, the supreme court has applied a non-per-se analysis to another, more 
commonly invoked, subsection of section 58-63-15. See infra notes 103–11 and 
accompanying text (discussing a key decision under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-15(11)). 
  In the end, the court in Jefferson-Pilot found no section 75-1.1 violation, because 
there was not actually a violation of section 58-63-15(1). 336 N.C. at 53, 442 S.E.2d at 318. 
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section 75-1.1. Second, the court might be inferring a legislative 
finding that whenever the predicate violation occurs, those acts satisfy 
the usual conduct standards under section 75-1.1.50 The North 
Carolina decisions to date, however, do not offer these or any other 
explanations for semi-explicit upgrading.51 
3.  Selective Upgrading 
Selective upgrading occurs when a predicate violation does not 
meet the above conditions, but still triggers a per se violation of 
section 75-1.1. Few North Carolina decisions have mentioned criteria 
for selective upgrading. The few decisions that have done so, 
however, have alluded to two tests. 
First, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has implied that for a 
predicate violation to be upgraded, the source of law for the predicate 
violation must contain a detailed standard. In Walker v. Fleetwood 
Homes of North Carolina, Inc.,52 the court stated that the predicate 
statute in an earlier case53 “defined in detail unfair methods of 
[settling] claims and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the 
insurance industry.”54 
Second, the supreme court has suggested that it will upgrade a 
predicate violation when the goals of the source of law overlap with 
the goals of section 75-1.1. For example, in Pearce v. American 
Defender Life Insurance Co.,55 the court emphasized that the goal of 
 
 50. See Fistos, supra note 11, at 63–64 (offering a similar explanation for “per se 
[violations] by description” under Florida’s section 5 analogue). 
 51. See cases cited supra note 49. 
 52. 362 N.C. 63, 653 S.E.2d 393 (2007). 
 53. See Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 71, 529 S.E.2d 676, 683 
(2000) (the earlier case); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-15(11) (2013) (the statute at 
issue in Gray). 
 54. Walker, 362 N.C. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 398–99 (emphasis added). As shown 
below, the decision that the Walker court was discussing, Gray, did not actually involve a 
per se violation. See infra notes 103–11 and accompanying text. 
 55. 316 N.C. 461, 343 S.E.2d 174 (1986). 
  It takes close reading to conclude that Pearce involves a per se violation. The 
opinion does not use the term “per se.” It uses only the ambiguous phrase “as a matter of 
law.” Id. at 470, 343 S.E.2d at 179; see also infra notes 172–85 and accompanying text 
(explaining the ambiguity of this phrase). In addition, although the court held that “a 
violation of N.C.G.S. § 58-54.4 as a matter of law constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade 
practice in violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1,” it also discussed whether the defendant’s 
statement “had the capacity or tendency to deceive.” Pearce, 316 N.C. at 470, 470–71, 343 
S.E.2d at 179, 180. The discussion of “capacity or tendency to deceive” suggests that the 
court was applying the usual conduct standard for deception under section 75-1.1—an 
inquiry that a per se violation would make unnecessary. See, e.g., Winston Realty Co. v. 
G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 98, 331 S.E.2d 677, 682 (1985) (stating this requirement for a 
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the predicate violation at issue was “to define and prohibit unfair and 
deceptive trade practices.”56 
Because these two standards for selective upgrading are open-
ended, it is hard to tell, based on these standards alone, whether a 
new predicate violation will qualify for per se treatment. Section 
III(B) of this Article analyzes this and other problems with selective 
upgrading.57 
4.  The Special Rule for Violations of Regulations (and Perhaps for 
Violations of Certain Statutes As Well) 
Recently—and in some tension with the above decisions—the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina has announced a categorical limit 
on upgrading. The court’s decision illustrates some of the lingering 
ambiguities in North Carolina upgrading standards. 
In Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of North Carolina, Inc.,58 the 
supreme court held that “violations of a licensure regulation . . . are 
not per se unfair or deceptive trade practices.”59 In dicta, moreover, 
the court appeared to extend this rule to “violation[s] of a regulatory 
statute which governs business activities.”60 
 
deception claim under section 75-1.1); see also supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text 
(noting that a per se theory makes proof under the usual conduct standards unnecessary). 
  On a close reading, however, the Pearce opinion seems to be probing capacity or 
tendency to deceive in connection with section 58-54.4, the predicate statute. See, e.g., 
Pearce, 316 N.C. at 470, 343 S.E.2d at 180 (“[I]n order for Mrs. Pearce to make out a claim 
under section 58-54.4 as augmented by section 75-1.1, she must show only some—but not 
all—of the same elements essential to making out a cause of action in fraud.”); id. at 472, 
343 S.E.2d at 181 (concluding that “[t]he evidence supporting the unfair trade practice 
claim by a violation of N.C.G.S. § 58-54.4 was sufficient” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 
471–72, 343 S.E.2d at 180–81 (discussing a non-conduct-related aspect of section 75-1.1: 
the requirement that the plaintiff rely on the defendant’s alleged misstatements). 
 56. Pearce, 316 N.C. at 469, 343 S.E.2d at 179. 
  In In re Fifth Third Bank, National Ass’n—Village of Penland Litigation, 217 N.C. 
App. 199, 719 S.E.2d 171 (2011), the North Carolina Court of Appeals likewise hinted at a 
“goal overlap” standard for upgrading. The court noted that the plaintiffs were arguing for 
upgrading on the theory that “ ‘the banking laws’ are, in a general sense, intended to 
further the public interest.” Id. at 209, 719 S.E.2d at 178 (appearing to quote plaintiffs’ 
brief); see also id. at 207, 719 S.E.2d at 176 (explaining that the court was evaluating a 
possible per se violation of section 75-1.1). 
  In the end, however, the court held that the plaintiffs’ reference to “the banking 
laws” was too vague to support any further analysis of upgrading. See id. at 209, 719 S.E.2d 
at 178. 
 57. See infra notes 139–63 and accompanying text. 
 58. 362 N.C. 63, 653 S.E.2d 393 (2007). 
 59. Id. at 64, 653 S.E.2d at 395. 
 60. Id. at 70, 653 S.E.2d at 398. 
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The trial court in Walker held that a mobile-home manufacturer 
had violated North Carolina regulations on mobile-home sales and 
service.61 Based on these violations, the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals expressly recognized a per se violation of section 75-1.1.62 
The decision of the court of appeals involved semi-explicit 
upgrading.63 The regulations at issue specifically state that “unfair or 
deceptive commercial acts or practices shall include” the acts in 
question.64 The court of appeals highlighted this aspect of the 
regulations when the court found a per se violation of section 75-1.1.65 
Despite this linkage between the text of the regulations and 
unfairness or deception, the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
reversed the finding of a per se violation.66 To explain this conclusion, 
the court drew a contrast between the regulations at issue in Walker 
and the predicate statute involved in Gray v. North Carolina 
Insurance Underwriting Ass’n,67 an earlier case in which the court had 
upheld liability under section 75-1.1.68 The Walker court stated that 
the predicate statute in Gray 
defined in detail unfair methods of [settling] claims and unfair 
and deceptive acts or practices in the insurance industry, 
 
 61. Id. at 69–70, 653 S.E.2d at 398 (quoting jury verdict and trial court’s judgment). 
 62. See Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 176 N.C. App. 668, 672, 627 S.E.2d 
629, 632 (2006) (“We conclude that the trial court properly decided that defendant’s 
violations of the Board’s regulation regarding [unfair and deceptive practices] constitute 
factors sufficient to support a claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.”), aff’d in part and 
modified in part, 362 N.C. 63, 653 S.E.2d 393 (2007). 
  The state supreme court, likewise, framed the issue as the presence or absence of 
a per se violation. See, e.g., Walker, 362 N.C. at 64, 653 S.E.2d at 395 (stating, in 
introduction to opinion, that the supreme court had decided that “violations of a licensure 
regulation . . . are not per se unfair or deceptive”). 
  Interestingly, the judgment that the appellate courts reviewed in Walker had less 
of a per se cast than the appellate opinions. The trial court, instead of relying on the mere 
existence of the predicate violation, stated that the “acts [found by the jury] constitute, as 
a matter of law, unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of [section 75-1.1].” Id. at 
70, 653 S.E.2d at 398 (emphasis added) (quoting trial court’s judgment); cf. supra text 
accompanying notes 36–37 (stating that the essence of a per se violation is treating the 
existence of the predicate violation, rather than the underlying facts, as dispositive). 
 63. See supra text accompanying note 47 (defining semi-explicit upgrading). 
 64. 11 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 8.0907 (2014); see also Walker, 362 N.C. at 69–70, 653 
S.E.2d at 398 (quoting the jury findings, which mirrored the wording of parts of this 
regulation). 
 65. Walker, 176 N.C. App. at 672, 627 S.E.2d at 632. 
 66. Walker, 362 N.C. at 71–73, 653 S.E.2d at 399–400. 
 67. 352 N.C. 61, 529 S.E.2d 676 (2000). 
 68. Walker, 362 N.C. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 398–99; see Gray, 352 N.C. at 71, 529 
S.E.2d at 683. As shown below, Gray does not actually apply per se reasoning. See infra 
notes 103–11 and accompanying text. Thus, Gray was an inapt decision for the supreme 
court to use to draw a contrast between Walker and a per se case. 
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thereby establishing the General Assembly’s intent to equate a 
violation of that statute with the more general provision of 
[section] 75-1.1. In contrast, the regulation at issue here was 
promulgated by the Department of Insurance pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. §§ 143-143.10 and 143-143.13. Because a violation of 
these statutes would not constitute a [section 75-1.1 violation] 
as a matter of law, we do not believe that a violation of a 
licensing regulation based upon those statutes is necessarily a 
[section 75-1.1 violation].69 
The Walker court also noted several times that the regulations at 
issue were connected with licensing.70 These licensing regulations, 
however, do not seem different in kind from the insurance statutes at 
issue in Gray. For example, state officials can use administrative 
proceedings to enforce both the statutes at issue in Gray and the 
regulations at issue in Walker.71 
In any event, the holding in Walker is explicit: “[V]iolations of a 
licensure regulation . . . are not per se unfair or deceptive trade 
practices.”72 
The Walker court also stated that “a violation of a regulatory 
statute which governs business activities . . . does not automatically 
result in an unfair or deceptive trade practice.”73 This reasoning was a 
dictum74—and perhaps even a slip of the pen75—because the court 
 
 69. Walker, 362 N.C. at 71, 653 S.E.2d at 399; see also infra notes 143–44 and 
accompanying text (analyzing this reasoning further). 
 70. See, e.g., Walker, 362 N.C. at 71, 653 S.E.2d at 399 (“[W]e decline to hold that a 
violation of a licensing regulation is a [section 75-1.1 violation] as a matter of law.”); see 
also id. at 68–69, 653 S.E.2d at 397–98 (describing the role of regulations in the licensing 
scheme for mobile-home manufacturers). 
 71. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-63-20 to -50 (2013) (providing administrative 
remedies for the statutes at issue in Gray), with id. § 143-143.13(a), (c) (providing 
administrative remedies for the statutes and rules at issue in Walker). 
 72. 362 N.C. at 64, 653 S.E.2d at 395. 
 73. Id. at 70, 653 S.E.2d at 398 (emphasis added). 
 74. Because the Supreme Court of North Carolina analyzed Walker as a case based on 
regulations, the court’s statements about the effects of statutory violations are dicta. See, 
e.g., Wood v. N.C. State Univ., 147 N.C. App. 336, 340, 556 S.E.2d 38, 40 (2001) (treating 
as dicta statements that involved a factual context different from the facts before the 
court); Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 
1074 (2005) (stating that “when a general proposition depends on a particular factual 
predicate, that factual predicate must be true on the facts of a case, or the factual predicate 
must be assumed to be true,” or the general proposition is a dictum (footnote omitted)). 
 75. The full passage that includes the phrases quoted above makes unclear whether 
the court was referring to a statutory violation or a violation of regulations. See Walker, 
362 N.C. at 70, 653 S.E.2d at 398 (“[A] violation of a regulatory statute which governs 
business activities ‘may also be a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.’ While such a 
regulatory violation may offend N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, the violation does not automatically 
result in an unfair or deceptive trade practice under that statute.” (emphasis added and 
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stated repeatedly that violations of licensing regulations were at 
issue.76 
The court’s rejection of regulatory statutes as predicate statutes 
is also surprising on the merits. The court did not define the 
disfavored category of regulatory statutes.77 Further, it is unclear why 
the court disfavored the two statutes that it cited. One of those 
statutes, after all, allows an agency to deny, suspend, or revoke a 
license for “[u]sing unfair methods of competition or committing 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”78 
As noted above, Walker involved semi-explicit upgrading.79 The 
court’s rejection of upgrading of regulatory violations, however, will 
probably apply with even greater force in cases of selective 
upgrading. By definition, the predicate regulations in selective-
upgrading cases, unlike the regulations at issue in Walker, would 
make no reference to unfairness or deception.80 
No decision since Walker has added any substance, scope, or 
limits to the decision. For example, no decision has elaborated on the 
court’s discussion of regulatory statutes.81 
 
deleted) (citation omitted) (quoting Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper Servs., Inc., 
108 N.C. App. 169, 172, 423 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1992))). 
 76. See id. at 64, 66, 68, 70, 71, 653 S.E.2d at 395, 396, 397, 398, 399. 
  The lower courts in Walker, however, put greater emphasis on the statutory 
violations than the supreme court did. The court of appeals held that the “defendant 
engaged in acts which are direct violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-143.13, which specifies 
grounds for denying, suspending, or revoking licenses of or imposing civil penalties on 
members of the manufactured housing industry.” Walker, 176 N.C. App. at 671, 627 S.E.2d 
at 632. The trial court in Walker, likewise, implied that the manufacturer had violated the 
underlying statute. The court stated: “North Carolina General Statute § 143-143.13(a)(7) 
sets out using unfair and deceptive acts or practices as defined in 11 NCAC 8.0907 as a 
ground for denying, suspending or revoking the license of a manufacturer of manufactured 
housing.” Walker, 362 N.C. at 69–70, 653 S.E.2d at 398 (quoting trial court’s judgment). 
 77. See Walker, 362 N.C. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 398–99. The court’s statements about 
regulatory statutes, moreover, silently departed from earlier decisions. For example, in 
Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985), the court 
specifically rejected the argument that “a Chapter 75 violation may not be based on the 
jury’s finding that [a] defendant violated [a statute that is] regulatory in nature.” Id. at 97, 
331 S.E.2d at 681; see also infra notes 112–20 and accompanying text (discussing Winston 
Realty). 
 78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-143.13(a)(7) (2013). 
 79. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 80. See 11 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 8.0907 (2014) (the regulations at issue in Walker); 
supra notes 47–56 and accompanying text (defining semi-explicit upgrading and selective 
upgrading). 
 81. Cf. Taylor v. United States, No. 7:11-CV-268-FL, 2014 WL 1096298, at *8 
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 19, 2014) (citing this aspect of Walker with a “cf.” signal and deciding that 
an administrator of a military health insurance program did not violate section 75-1.1 by 
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Section III(B) below further discusses the ambiguities in Walker 
and the distinctions applied in the decision.82 
B. The Near Relatives of Per Se Violations 
In addition to the per se theories discussed above, North 
Carolina courts have also created several near relatives of per se 
violations. These theories arise when courts split the difference 
between recognizing a per se violation of section 75-1.1 and deciding 
that a predicate violation has no effect on the analysis under section 
75-1.1. 
The near relatives fall into four categories: 
 
•  First, courts sometimes state that a predicate violation is not 
a per se violation, but is “evidence of” or “relevant to” a 
section 75-1.1 violation.83 
 
•  Second, courts occasionally state that a predicate violation 
provides an example of conduct that violates the usual 
conduct standard under section 75-1.1.84 
 
•  Third, courts often state that a predicate violation “may be” 
a violation of section 75-1.1.85 Although this phrase could 
 
committing a minor violation of regulations), appeal docketed, No. 14-1476 (4th Cir. May 
16, 2014). 
  A number of courts have made decisions within the ambit of Walker without 
addressing Walker. See, e.g., In re Hinson, 481 B.R. 364, 377 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2012) 
(holding, on a non-per-se basis and without citing Walker, that violations of federal agency 
pronouncements that implement the Home Affordable Modification Program “can 
constitute the type of unfair or unscrupulous behavior which N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 seeks to 
prevent”); Weber Hodges & Godwin Commercial Real Estate Servs., LLC v. Hartley, No. 
COA13-207, 2013 WL 4716368, at *4–5 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2013) (unpublished) 
(holding, without citing Walker, that violations of a trade association’s self-regulatory rules 
were not a per se violation of section 75-1.1); Bartlett Milling Co. v. Walnut Grove 
Auction & Realty Co., 192 N.C. App. 74, 82–83, 665 S.E.2d 478, 486 (2008) (holding, 
without citing Walker, that the plaintiffs did not preserve an argument that violations of 
auctioneer-licensing statutes were a per se violation of section 75-1.1). 
 82. See infra notes 143–53 and accompanying text. 
 83. E.g., Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 71, 653 S.E.2d 393, 
399 (2007); see infra notes 97–102 and accompanying text. 
 84. E.g., Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 71, 529 S.E.2d 676, 683 
(2000); see infra notes 103–11 and accompanying text. 
 85. E.g., Stanley v. Moore, 339 N.C. 717, 724, 454 S.E.2d 225, 229 (1995); Drouillard v. 
Keister Williams Newspaper Servs., Inc., 108 N.C. App. 169, 172, 423 S.E.2d 324, 326 
(1992); Keister v. Nat’l Council of the Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of the U.S., No. 12 
CVS 1137, 2013 WL 3864583, at *3 (N.C. Bus. Ct. July 18, 2013). 
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suggest that a predicate violation might be a per se violation 
of section 75-1.1, courts more often use the phrase to reject 
the conclusion that the existence of a predicate violation bars 
a claim under section 75-1.1.86 
 
•  Finally, a few decisions contain what one might call illusory 
per se reasoning. They announce that a predicate violation 
states a violation of section 75-1.1 if the plaintiff also satisfies 
the usual conduct standard for a section 75-1.1 claim.87 
 
Having these near-relative theories on the books alongside per se 
violations, with no explanation of the role of each, is a recipe for 
confusion. Section III(A) below analyzes the near-relative theories 
and the problems they create. 
III.  THE KEY PROBLEMS WITH PER SE THEORIES UNDER SECTION 
75-1.1 
Part II of this Article has described the existing standards for per 
se violations and their near relatives. The following part of the Article 
explains three sets of problems with these standards. 
The first problem is the very existence of the near relatives. 
Under current law, some predicate violations generate per se 
violations of section 75-1.1, but other predicate violations produce 
weaker effects. The nature of these weaker effects is unclear. Even 
less clear is why courts have announced these effects, as opposed to 
per se violations.88 
The second set of problems involves the current standards for 
selective upgrading. These standards are ambiguous in several 
respects.89 Moreover, even when courts have announced standards in 
clear language, the standards break down under close scrutiny.90 
The third set of problems stems from the ambiguity of a key 
phrase used in this area: “as a matter of law.” This phrase has allowed 
courts to blur the line between per se theories and their near 
 
 86. See infra notes 112–28 and accompanying text. 
 87. See, e.g., Drouillard, 108 N.C. App. at 172, 423 S.E.2d at 326; see infra notes 129–
36 and accompanying text. 
 88. See infra notes 94–138 and accompanying text. 
 89. See infra notes 139–53 and accompanying text. 
 90. See infra notes 154–63 and accompanying text. 
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relatives.91 It has also caused non-per-se decisions to be 
misunderstood, in later cases, as per se decisions.92 
The following subsections discuss these three sets of problems in 
turn. 
A. The Problems of the Near Relatives 
When North Carolina courts have considered per se violations of 
section 75-1.1, they have often made compromise decisions. They 
have not been willing to say that a predicate violation is a per se 
violation of section 75-1.1 (and thus automatically generates treble 
damages under section 75-16).93 However, they have also been 
unwilling to say the opposite—that a predicate violation makes no 
difference to the analysis under section 75-1.1. 
Instead, the courts have often split the difference between these 
two outcomes. They have used a variety of phrases to say that a 
predicate violation does not automatically establish a section 75-1.1 
violation, but is not a matter of indifference either. These theories, 
discussed below, are the near relatives of per se violations. 
The near relatives are a problem, not a solution. Studying the 
near relatives in the context of decided cases shows their essential 
flaws: courts have not explained what these variations on a per se 
theory really mean, when each variation applies, or why any of the 
variations even exist. This lack of explanation leaves the effect of new 
predicate violations unclear. 
1.  “Relevant to” or “Evidence of” 
In Walker,94 the Supreme Court of North Carolina mentioned 
two near-relative theories. In doing so, the court illustrated some of 
the problems with these theories. 
Walker held that a violation of a licensing regulation is not a per 
se violation of section 75-1.1.95 The court, however, did not hold that a 
violation of a licensing regulation adds nothing to a section 75-1.1 
 
 91. See infra notes 164–71 and accompanying text. 
 92. See infra notes 172–85 and accompanying text. 
 93. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2013); Bhatti v. Buckland, 328 N.C. 240, 243, 400 
S.E.2d 440, 442 (1991) (“If a violation of Chapter 75 is found, treble damages must be 
awarded.”). 
 94. Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 653 S.E.2d 393 (2007); see 
also supra notes 58–80 and accompanying text (discussing the rejection of a per se 
violation in Walker). 
 95. Walker, 362 N.C. at 64, 70, 653 S.E.2d at 395, 398; see supra notes 58–72 and 
accompanying text. 
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claim.96 On the contrary, the court stated twice that a violation of a 
licensing regulation adds something: 
 
•  “[A] regulatory licensure violation may be evidence of a 
[section 75-1.1 violation]. Thus, even though defendant’s 
violations of [the regulations at issue] are not unfair or 
deceptive trade practices per se, those violations are 
potentially relevant to any claim that defendant violated 
[section] 75-1.1.”97 
 
•  Jury findings that show violations of a licensing regulation 
“can be evidence of unfair or deceptive practices and, in 
combination with other facts, might be sufficient to prove a 
[section 75-1.1] claim.”98 
 
In these passages, the supreme court stated that a violation of a 
licensing regulation falls short of a per se violation of section 75-1.1, 
but still promotes a section 75-1.1 violation.99 The court, however, did 
not say how much (or how little) help a regulatory violation would 
give a plaintiff. Likewise, the court did not explain the respective 
roles of a regulatory violation and other facts when a court analyzes a 
section 75-1.1 claim. In the seven years since Walker, no other opinion 
has taken up these questions.100 
Thus, the case law leaves unclear how a predicate violation that 
does not support a per se violation of section 75-1.1 affects a court’s 
non-per-se analysis. In particular, the case law offers no answer to the 
pivotal question: Why would a predicate violation fall short of a per 
se violation, but still be important enough to turn facts that do not 
violate section 75-1.1 into facts that do? 
Given the problems that appellate courts have had in applying 
per se violations,101 there is little reason to believe that busy trial 
 
 96. See Walker, 362 N.C. at 71, 653 S.E.2d at 399. 
 97. Id. (emphasis added; stylistic italics deleted). 
 98. Id. at 72, 653 S.E.2d at 400 (emphasis added). 
 99. See id. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 398–99. 
 100. The only known use of Walker’s non-per-se reasoning appears in an unpublished 
decision of the Fourth Circuit. In Country Vintner of North Carolina, LLC v. E & J Gallo 
Winery, Inc., 461 F. App’x 302 (4th Cir. 2012), the court observed that a “violation of . . . a 
regulatory statute may be evidence of an unfair or deceptive trade practice, even if it is not 
a per se violation of [section 75-1.1].” Id. at 305 (citing Walker, 362 N.C. at 70–71, 653 
S.E.2d at 398–99). The court, however, did not apply this principle, because it found no 
violation of the regulatory statute in question. Id. 
 101. See infra notes 139–63 and accompanying text. 
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courts can answer the above questions with any rigor or 
consistency.102 
2.  “Examples” of a Violation of the Usual Conduct Standard 
In other opinions, courts likewise shy away from a per se theory, 
but hold that a predicate violation satisfies the usual conduct standard 
under section 75-1.1.103 
The most important decision of this type is Gray v. North 
Carolina Insurance Underwriting Ass’n.104 The plaintiffs in Gray won 
in the trial court by arguing that a violation of a North Carolina 
statute on the handling of insurance claims105 was a per se violation of 
section 75-1.1.106 Trouble arose, however, when the court of appeals 
decided that a key element of this predicate violation was missing.107 
In the state supreme court, the parties debated whether a predicate 
 
 102. The history of Walker on remand illustrates the low likelihood that trial courts can 
apply a “less than per se” analysis rigorously. On remand, the trial court held that the 
same predicate violations that the supreme court had rejected as per se violations still 
violated section 75-1.1—indeed, violated it in seven ways. Although the trial court had 
earlier relied on a per se theory, it held on remand that the defendant’s violations of the 
mobile-home statutes and regulations were “contrary to public policy and substantially 
injurious to the plaintiffs, consumers,” “unfair and unscrupulous,” acts that “amounted to 
an inequitable assertion of power by the defendant over the plaintiffs, consumers,” 
“deceptive,” “substantially aggravated by the repeated failures to respond to consumer 
complaints and the repeated failures to properly repair the known defects in the home,” 
acts that had “a substantial impact on the market place of manufactured housing,” and 
“unethical, unscrupulous, oppressive, and . . . substantially injurious to consumers.” 
Amended Judgment concls. of law 6–12, Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., No. 02 
CVS 569 (Craven Cnty., N.C. Super. Ct. July 1, 2008). 
 103. See, e.g., Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 71, 73, 529 S.E.2d 676, 
683, 684 (2000). 
 104. Id. 
 105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-15(11) (2013). 
 106. Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 132 N.C. App. 63, 65, 510 S.E.2d 396, 398 
(1999) (reciting this history), rev’d, 352 N.C. at 61, 529 S.E.2d at 676; Plaintiff-Appellant’s 
Brief at 12, Gray, 352 N.C. 61, 529 S.E.2d 676 (No. 84PA99). 
 107. See Gray, 132 N.C. App. at 68–69, 510 S.E.2d at 400 (“[W]e find that there was 
insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that any of the acts of 
defendant were done with such frequency as to indicate a ‘general business practice.’ ”); 
see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-15(11) (requiring, for a violation, that an insurer commit 
specified bad acts “with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice”). 
  The plaintiffs faced an additional hurdle as well: the claims-handling statute, 
section 58-63-15(11), expressly disclaimed a private right of action. See id. (“[N]o violation 
of this subsection shall of itself create any cause of action in favor of any person other than 
the Commissioner [of Insurance].”). In earlier cases, however, the state courts had decided 
that for another subsection of section 58-63-15, section 75-1.1 creates the otherwise 
missing right of action. See, e.g., Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 336 N.C. 49, 53, 
442 S.E.2d 316, 318 (1994); Pearce v. Am. Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 470, 343 
S.E.2d 174, 179–80 (1986). 
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violation that was missing a key element could nonetheless establish a 
per se violation of section 75-1.1.108 
The supreme court did not resolve this debate. Instead of finding 
a per se violation of section 75-1.1, the court found a violation 
“separate from and not based upon a violation of” the predicate 
statute.109 The court held that conduct that violates the predicate 
statute “embodies the broader standards of [section] 75-1.1 because 
such conduct is inherently unfair, unscrupulous, immoral, and 
injurious to consumers. Thus, such conduct . . . constitutes a violation 
of [section] 75-1.1, as a matter of law.”110 
When the court applied these broader standards, it stated that it 
“agree[d] with the practice of looking to [the predicate statute] for 
examples of conduct to support a finding of unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.”111 The court, however, did not explain how a statute might 
state examples of violations of section 75-1.1, yet fail to establish a per 
se violation of that statute. Although the word “examples” suggests 
that some violations of the predicate statute in Gray fall short of 
violating section 75-1.1, the opinion does not explain when such a 
shortfall could occur. 
3.  Extending a Conclusion That a Section 75-1.1 Claim Is Not Barred 
In several of the early cases that contributed to the per se theory, 
the North Carolina courts did not apply upgrading at all. Instead, the 
courts simply rejected arguments that because a more specific statute 
covered the acts at issue, section 75-1.1 could not apply. In several of 
these “claim not barred” cases, the courts went on to uphold non-per-
se liability under section 75-1.1. The decisions, however, expressed 
both of these conclusions in ambiguous language. These ambiguities 
have caused the early opinions to be misunderstood in later cases. 
 
 108. See Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief at 17, Gray, 352 N.C. 61, 529 S.E.2d 676 (No. 
84PA99); Defendant-Appellee’s New Brief at 11, Gray, 352 N.C. 61, 529 S.E.2d 676 (No. 
84PA99). 
 109. Gray, 352 N.C. at 67, 529 S.E.2d at 680 (“Plaintiffs contend that defendant 
violated [the claims-handling statute] constituting a violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 and that 
defendant violated N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 separate from and not based upon a violation of [the 
claims-handling statute]. We agree with plaintiffs’ latter contention.”). Notably, the trial 
court had rejected this non-per-se theory, and the court of appeals had affirmed that 
ruling. See Gray, 132 N.C. App. at 73, 510 S.E.2d at 402–03. 
 110. Gray, 352 N.C. at 71, 529 S.E.2d at 683. As shown below, this use of “as a matter 
of law” has led later courts to misread Gray as a per se case. See infra notes 172–85 and 
accompanying text. 
 111. Gray, 352 N.C. at 71, 529 S.E.2d at 683 (emphasis added). 
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An often-cited decision of this type is Winston Realty Co. v. 
G.H.G., Inc.112 An employee-placement firm falsely told a client that 
it had investigated the background of a new bookkeeper.113 When the 
bookkeeper embezzled from the client, the client sued the placement 
firm.114 The client alleged violations of a North Carolina statute that 
regulates placement firms,115 as well as section 75-1.1. 
The placement firm argued that “a Chapter 75 violation may not 
be based on the jury’s finding that defendant violated the [placement-
firm statute], because these provisions are regulatory in nature.”116 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected this argument. The 
court stated: “Although the authority to enforce the [placement-firm 
statute] rests with the Commissioner of Labor, it is obvious that the 
list of proscribed acts found in [that statute was] designed to protect 
the consuming public.”117 This point led the court to conclude that a 
violation of the placement-firm statute “as a matter of law constitutes 
an unfair or deceptive trade practice in violation of [section 75-
1.1].”118 
Although the phrase “as a matter of law” might imply that the 
court was recognizing a per se violation,119 the opinion as a whole 
contradicts that reading. The court never used the phrase “per se.” 
More importantly, it affirmed a judgment under section 75-1.1 only 
after reviewing the evidence and applying the usual conduct standard 
 
 112. 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985); see, e.g., Gray, 352 N.C. at 70, 529 S.E.2d at 
682 (citing Winston Realty, 341 N.C. at 97, 331 S.E.2d at 681); Stanley v. Moore, 339 N.C. 
717, 723, 454 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1995) (citing generally Winston Realty); Ellis v. N. Star Co., 
326 N.C. 219, 225, 388 S.E.2d 127, 131 (1990) (same); Pearce, 316 N.C. at 469–70, 343 
S.E.2d at 179–80 (discussing Winston Realty); In re Fifth Third Bank, Nat’l Ass’n—Vill. of 
Penland Litig., 216 N.C. App. 482, 490, 716 S.E.2d 850, 856 (2011) (quoting Winston 
Realty Co. v. G.H.G. Inc., 70 N.C. App. 374, 380–81, 320 S.E.2d 286, 290 (1984), aff’d, 314 
N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985)); Media Network, Inc. v. Long Haymes Carr, Inc., 197 N.C. 
App. 433, 452–53, 678 S.E.2d 671, 684 (2009) (discussing Winston Realty). 
 113. Winston Realty, 314 N.C. at 93, 331 S.E.2d at 679. 
 114. See id. 
 115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-47.6(2), (9) (2013). 
 116. Winston Realty, 314 N.C. at 97, 331 S.E.2d at 681. The supreme court also noted 
that the regulatory statute contained no private right of action, but the court did not 
attribute that point to an argument by the defendant. See id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. In fact, the phrase “as a matter of law” in section 75-1.1 opinions usually states 
much less than a per se violation. It usually refers to the rule that courts, not juries, decide 
whether a fact pattern violates the conduct standard under section 75-1.1. See, e.g., Hardy 
v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 309, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975) (the seminal case on this rule); see 
also supra note 42 (discussing the two meanings of “as a matter of law” in Hardy); infra 
notes 164–85 and accompanying text (discussing the problems caused by the ambiguity of 
“as a matter of law” in potential per se cases under section 75-1.1). 
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under the statute.120 A per se analysis would have made this 
evaluation of the evidence unnecessary. 
In sum, Winston Realty, one of the most frequently cited 
precedents in per se cases, is not itself a per se decision. It simply 
rejects arguments that when other statutes and regulations apply, 
section 75-1.1 cannot. 
Other decisions follow a similar pattern. They reject defendants’ 
arguments, but they stop well short of upgrading predicate violations 
to per se violations of section 75-1.1.121 Several of these decisions say, 
for example, that a given predicate violation “may be” a violation of 
section 75-1.1.122 
 
 120. See Winston Realty, 314 N.C. at 97–98, 331 S.E.2d at 681–82; see also id. at 98, 331 
S.E.2d at 682 (“A practice is unfair when it offends established public policy as well as 
when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially 
injurious to consumers. [A] practice is deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to 
deceive; proof of actual deception is not required.” (citations omitted) (quoting Marshall 
v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 548, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981))). 
 121. See, e.g., Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 71, 529 S.E.2d 676, 
683 (2000) (“Although N.C.G.S. § 58-63-15(11) does regulate settlement claims in the 
insurance industry, insurance companies are not immune to the general principles and 
provisions of [section] 75-1.1.”); Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Long, 113 N.C. App. 187, 196, 439 
S.E.2d 599, 604 (1993) (“[U]nfair and deceptive acts in the insurance area are not 
regulated exclusively by [section] 58-63 . . . but are also actionable under [section] 75-
1.1.”); Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper Servs., Inc., 108 N.C. App. 169, 172, 423 
S.E.2d 324, 326 (1992) (“[The counterclaim defendants] contend that because the 
Legislature did not specifically provide that any violation of [the North Carolina Trade 
Secrets Protection Act] would constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices under N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, such a result was not intended. We disagree. . . . This Court has 
repeatedly held that the violation of regulatory statutes which govern business activities 
may also be a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 . . . .” (emphasis added)); Ellis v. Smith-
Broadhurst, Inc., 48 N.C. App. 180, 183, 268 S.E.2d 271, 273 (1980) (rejecting arguments 
similar to the ones that were rejected in Winston Realty, then stating: “We hold, therefore, 
that G.S. 75-1.1 provides a remedy for unfair trade practices in the insurance industry” 
(emphasis added)). But see Brinkman v. Barrett Kays & Assocs., P.A., 155 N.C. App. 738, 
745, 575 S.E.2d 40, 45 (2003) (“We conclude that plaintiffs may not utilize Chapter 75 to 
create a private right of action where none existed and thereby circumvent the intent of 
the legislature to have the honesty requirement in the enforcement section of the Clean 
Water Act enforced as provided for in that section.”); cf. Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. 
Va., 367 N.C. 81, 91–92, 747 S.E.2d 220, 228–29 (2013) (rejecting section 75-1.1 claim for 
charging “excessive” prices, in part because North Carolina’s price-gouging statute, N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 75-38, which contains an explicit cross-reference to section 75-1.1, did not 
apply). 
 122. E.g., Stanley v. Moore, 339 N.C. 717, 724, 454 S.E.2d 225, 229 (1995) (rejecting 
defendants’ arguments, then stating that “it is clear that conduct which violates the 
Ejectment of Residential Tenants Act may also constitute a violation of the Unfair and 
Deceptive Practices Act”); Drouillard, 108 N.C. App. at 172, 423 S.E.2d at 326 (rejecting 
defendants’ arguments, then holding that a violation of the North Carolina Trade Secrets 
Protection Act “may also be a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1”); see also United 
Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 665, 370 S.E.2d 375, 389 (1988) (rejecting similar 
arguments, then refusing to limit section 75-1.1 to the fact patterns in earlier cases). 
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In later decisions, however, these limited conclusions have been 
extended beyond their history as rejections of defendants’ arguments. 
For example, in Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), LLC,123 the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals cited Winston Realty for the 
following proposition: “North Carolina appellate courts have held 
that violations of certain regulatory statutes are per se violations of 
[section] 75-1.1.”124 
Courts have likewise misinterpreted the “may be” decisions. In 
Walker, the Supreme Court of North Carolina emphasized that just 
because a predicate violation may violate section 75-1.1, that 
possibility does not necessarily establish a per se violation.125 At least 
two courts, however, have treated the decision that Walker cited for 
this point, Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper Services, Inc.,126 
as a basis for finding a per se violation.127 
These problems arose because in Winston Realty, Drouillard, and 
similar decisions, the courts did not clarify which of three possible 
holdings they were announcing: 
 
•  The mere fact that a predicate statute or regulation covers 
certain activities does not bar section 75-1.1 from applying to 
those activities. 
 
  This “may be” reasoning has spread to decisions that do not focus on defendants’ 
arguments. See, e.g., Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 70, 653 S.E.2d 
393, 398 (2007) (“While [a violation of a regulatory statute] may offend N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, 
the violation does not automatically result in an unfair or deceptive trade practice under 
that statute.”); In re Fifth Third Bank, Nat’l Ass’n—Vill. of Penland Litig., 217 N.C. App. 
199, 207, 719 S.E.2d 171, 176 (2011) (quoting same sentence from Walker, then stating: 
“For that reason, a violation of a consumer protection statute may, in some instances, 
constitute a per se violation of [section 75-1.1]”); Ausley v. Bishop, 133 N.C. App. 210, 216, 
515 S.E.2d 72, 77 (1999) (“[S]lander per se may constitute a violation of section 75-1.1.”). 
 123. 199 N.C. App. 163, 681 S.E.2d 448 (2009). 
 124. Id. at 170, 681 S.E.2d at 454. For the same point, the court also cited Gray, another 
non-per-se decision. See supra notes 104–11 and accompanying text (explaining Gray); see 
also infra notes 172–78 (discussing other decisions that misinterpret Gray). 
 125. Walker, 362 N.C. at 70, 653 S.E.2d at 398. 
 126. 108 N.C. App. at 172, 423 S.E.2d at 326 (rejecting defendants’ arguments, then 
holding that a violation of the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act “may also be a 
violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1”); see also infra notes 129–36 and accompanying text 
(further discussing Drouillard and its problems). 
 127. See Static Control Components, Inc. v. Darkprint Imaging, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 
465, 487 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (citing Drouillard, 108 N.C. App. at 172, 423 S.E.2d at 326, and 
then concluding that trade secret misappropriation, with no additional substantive 
showing, violated section 75-1.1); Kewaunee Sci. Corp. v. Pegram, 130 N.C. App. 576, 581, 
502 S.E.2d 417, 420 (1998) (citing Drouillard, 108 N.C. App. at 172, 423 S.E.2d at 326, and 
then concluding, with no additional substantive showing, that a violation of a criminal 
statute on commercial bribery “should also be considered a violation of G.S. 75-1.1”). 
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•  A predicate violation states a per se violation of section 75-
1.1—that is, every instance of that predicate violation 
satisfies the conduct standard under section 75-1.1. 
 
•  The predicate violation falls short of a per se violation of 
section 75-1.1, but nonetheless promotes a non-per-se 
violation of section 75-1.1. 
 
Phrases like “may be” could state any one of these propositions. 
Winston Realty and Drouillard, however, stand only for the first 
proposition—a rejection of defendants’ arguments.128 
As the above decisions illustrate, conclusions like “may be” are 
so elastic that they cause confusion in later cases. 
4.  A Per Se Violation if There Is a Non-Per-Se Violation 
Finally, North Carolina courts have issued what one might call 
illusory per se decisions. An illusory per se decision states that a 
predicate violation is a “per se” violation of section 75-1.1, but only if 
a conflicting condition is satisfied: that the defendant’s acts meet the 
usual conduct standard under section 75-1.1. 
The leading decision of this type is Drouillard.129 In that case, the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals stated that if a violation of North 
Carolina’s “Trade Secrets Protection Act satisfies [the usual] three 
prong test [under section 75-1.1], it would be a violation of [section] 
75-1.1.”130 
The court in Noble131 relied on similar reasoning. The court 
quoted Drouillard, then stated: “Plaintiffs have failed to allege 
actions which constitute the first element of a claim under [section 75-
1.1]: ‘an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of 
competition[.]’ Thus, the alleged violation of the statutes and 
regulations cited by Plaintiffs does not constitute a violation of 
 
 128. See supra notes 112–20, 125 and accompanying text. 
 129. 108 N.C. App. at 169, 423 S.E.2d at 324. 
 130. Id. at 172, 423 S.E.2d at 326 (emphasis added); accord Awarepoint Corp. v. Noel, 
No. 11 CVS 19136, 2012 WL 2603309, ¶ 23 (N.C. Bus. Ct. May 14, 2012) (containing 
similar reasoning). 
 131. Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), LLC, 199 N.C. App. 163, 681 S.E.2d 448 
(2009). 
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[section 75-1.1].”132 This reasoning is a contradiction in terms. If a 
plaintiff has to satisfy the usual conduct standard under section 75-1.1 
in any event,133 what is the relevance of a predicate violation?134 
Unsurprisingly, the illusory per se decisions have been 
interpreted inconsistently in later cases. Some courts have taken 
Drouillard literally and have required plaintiffs to make the same 
showing that they would have to make in the absence of a predicate 
violation.135 Other courts, however, have upgraded predicate 
violations to per se violations of section 75-1.1, citing Drouillard—an 
illusory per se decision—as authority for this upgrading.136 In short, 
illusory per se reasoning has produced only confusion. 
 
* * * 
 
As the above subsections suggest, the near relatives of per se 
violations are little more than coping mechanisms. They relieve courts 
from choosing between two absolute outcomes: (1) deciding that a 
predicate violation does nothing to promote a section 75-1.1 violation 
or (2) deciding that it automatically amounts to a section 75-1.1 
violation. 
 
 132. Id. at 171, 681 S.E.2d at 455 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Furr v. Fonville Morisey Realty, Inc., 130 N.C. App. 541, 551, 503 S.E.2d 401, 408 
(1998)). 
 133. See Drouillard, 108 N.C. App. at 172, 423 S.E.2d at 326. 
 134. Proving the elements of a predicate violation, after all, will often present daunting 
challenges of its own. See, e.g., AECOM Tech. Corp. v. Keating, No. 11 CVS 9225, 2012 
WL 370296, at *3–4 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Feb. 6, 2012) (upholding section 75-1.1 claim but 
rejecting plaintiffs’ claim for misappropriation of trade secrets). 
 135. See, e.g., Awarepoint, 2012 WL 2603309, ¶¶ 23–24 (citing Drouillard, 108 N.C. 
App. at 172, 423 S.E.2d at 326, but then analyzing the facts of Awarepoint in light of non-
per-se case law); Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Head & Engquist Equip., L.L.C., No. 00 CVS 
10358, 2003 WL 21017456, at *50–54 (N.C. Bus. Ct. May 2, 2003) (conducting similar, but 
more extensive, analysis), aff’d, 174 N.C. App. 49, 620 S.E.2d 222 (2005). 
 136. See, e.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Darkprint Imaging, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 
2d 465, 487 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (“The North Carolina Court of Appeals has held that trade 
secret misappropriation can constitute a violation of § 75-1.1 if it also affects commerce 
and is the proximate cause of Static Control’s actual injury. See [Drouillard]. . . . Static 
Control has thus demonstrated a cause of action for unfair or deceptive trade practices.”); 
Kewaunee Sci. Corp. v. Pegram, 130 N.C. App. 576, 581, 503 S.E.2d 417, 420 (1998) (citing 
Drouillard, 108 N.C. App. at 172, 423 S.E.2d at 326, then concluding that a violation of a 
criminal bribery statute “should also be considered a violation of G.S. 75-1.1 as an unfair 
and deceptive trade practice”); Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Head & Engquist Equip., L.L.C., 
No. 00 CVS 10358, 2002 WL 31002955, at *16–17 (N.C. Bus. Ct. July 10, 2002) (citing 
generally Drouillard, then reasoning that because a claim under North Carolina Trade 
Secrets Protection Act had survived summary judgment, a section 75-1.1 claim necessarily 
survived summary judgment as well), aff’d on other grounds, 174 N.C. App. 49, 620 S.E.2d 
222 (2005). 
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This relief comes at a steep price. Opinions that apply the near 
relatives offer no standards to help a court decide whether the next 
predicate violation—or, for that matter, the same predicate 
violation—generates liability under section 75-1.1. This lack of 
standards makes the outcome of later cases unpredictable to lawyers 
and clients.137 Unpredictability makes lawsuits under section 75-1.1 
last longer and arise more often.138 
B. Unclear Standards for Selective Upgrading 
Problems with the relationship between predicate violations and 
section 75-1.1 are not limited to the near-relative theories described 
above. Similar problems arise when courts consider selective 
upgrading.139 Only a few North Carolina decisions announce tests to 
govern this important form of upgrading. As shown below, these tests 
are ambiguous. Even the clearly defined aspects of these tests, 
moreover, draw questionable distinctions. 
1.  Ambiguous Standards 
As noted above, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has 
mentioned two possible circumstances in which it will upgrade a 
predicate violation to a per se violation of section 75-1.1.140 First, the 
court has implied that upgrading will occur when a predicate violation 
states a detailed conduct standard.141 Second, the court has upgraded 
predicate violations whose goals overlap with the goals of section 75-
1.1.142 
 
 137. See, e.g., Neil W. Averitt, The Elements of a Policy Statement on Section 5, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 15 (Oct. 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba 
/publishing/antitrust_source/oct13_averitt_10_29f.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing the 
importance of predictable standards under section 5 of the FTC Act); supra note 21 and 
accompanying text (explaining the relationship between section 5 and section 75-1.1). 
 138. See supra notes 31, 33–34 and accompanying text (discussing the high volume of 
litigation under section 75-1.1); see also Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 2035–36 
(discussing how unpredictable standards affect litigation strategy in section 75-1.1 cases). 
 139. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text (defining and discussing selective 
upgrading). 
 140. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
 141. See, e.g., Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 71, 653 S.E.2d 
393, 399 (2007) (noting that a predicate statute that had supported upgrading in an earlier 
case “defined in detail unfair methods of [settling] claims and unfair and deceptive acts or 
practices in the insurance industry”). 
 142. See, e.g., Pearce v. Am. Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 469, 343 S.E.2d 174, 
179 (1986) (upgrading a predicate violation because its goal “is to define and prohibit 
unfair and deceptive trade practices”); see also In re Fifth Third Bank, Nat’l Ass’n—Vill. 
of Penland Litig., 217 N.C. App. 199, 209, 719 S.E.2d 171, 178 (2011) (implying that 
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These implied standards for upgrading raise unanswered 
questions. For example, does a predicate violation need to satisfy only 
one, or both, of the above tests? Recent decisions use ambiguous 
language on this point. 
In Walker,143 for instance, the supreme court noted that the 
statute at issue in Gray “defined in detail unfair methods of [settling] 
claims and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the insurance 
industry, thereby establishing the General Assembly’s intent to 
equate a violation of that statute with the more general provision of 
[section] 75-1.1.”144 Which feature established the General 
Assembly’s intent—the detailed definition, the focus of the predicate 
statute on unfair and deceptive acts, or both? The unclear antecedent 
of the word “thereby” in Walker leaves this question unanswered. 
Likewise, in Noble,145 the court of appeals stated that a per se 
violation of section 75-1.1 arises when a predicate statute “specifically 
defines . . . conduct which is unfair or deceptive within the meaning of 
[section] 75-1.1.”146 This phrase, too, is ambiguous on whether a 
specific definition of prohibited conduct in a predicate statute is 
sufficient, or merely necessary. 
To try to resolve these ambiguities, one can analyze the predicate 
statutes discussed in these opinions. Here, however, this technique 
does not add much clarity. 
The court in Walker stated, for example, that a violation of the 
manufactured-home statutes that underlie the regulations at issue 
“would not constitute a [section 75-1.1 violation] as a matter of 
law.”147 Under the standards discussed above, this conclusion is 
surprising. The manufactured-home statutes allow a regulatory 
 
violations of banking laws could support a per se violation of section 75-1.1 because the 
banking laws are “intended to further the public interest”). 
 143. 362 N.C. at 71, 653 S.E.2d at 399. 
 144. Id. (emphasis added). 
 145. Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), LLC, 199 N.C. App. 163, 681 S.E.2d 448 
(2009). 
 146. Id. at 170, 681 S.E.2d at 454 (emphasis added). The court applied the same 
standard when it rejected upgrading because the predicate statutes at issue “do not 
specifically define and proscribe unfair or deceptive conduct within the meaning of N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.” Id. at 171, 681 S.E.2d at 455; cf. Trimark Foodcraft, Inc. v. Leger, No. 
COA13-923, 2014 WL 2781761, at *3–4 (N.C. Ct. App. June 17, 2014) (unpublished) 
(opining that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-24 meets this standard, but holding that the 
defendant’s conduct did not violate section 44A-24). 
 147. Walker, 362 N.C. at 71, 653 S.E.2d at 399. 
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agency to issue sanctions when a dealer “commit[s] unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices.”148 
The discussion of predicate statutes in Noble is equally 
surprising. As one example of a per se violation, the Noble court cited 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-47.6, the statute at issue in Winston Realty.149 
That statute states only that “[a] private personnel service shall not 
engage in” twelve listed acts.150 The listed acts do not expressly 
include unfair or deceptive conduct.151 
According to Walker and Noble, then, a predicate statute that 
penalizes unfair or deceptive acts—in those terms—in the sale of a 
consumer product does not support a per se violation of section 75-
1.1, but a predicate statute that involves a business service, and that 
does not literally refer to unfair or deceptive acts, does support a per 
se violation. These counterintuitive conclusions offer little guidance 
to a court that must decide whether a different predicate violation 
states a per se violation of section 75-1.1. 
The situation does not improve if one focuses on the language in 
Walker and Noble that mentions the degree of specificity or detail in 
predicate statutes.152 Neither of those decisions, nor any later one, 
announces any standards for the level of specificity required. Indeed, 
the courts in Walker and Noble did not analyze the level of specificity 
of the predicate statutes they cited.153 
Finally, identifying the courts’ conclusions on these issues 
requires a reader to draw inferences from the statutes cited in the 
 
 148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-143.13(a)(7) (2013). These statutes, moreover, were 
enacted for the express purpose of protecting consumers. See id. § 143-143.8 (noting the 
“legislative intent to promote the general welfare and safety of manufactured home 
residents in North Carolina”). Given the overt focus of these statutes on consumer 
protection, one can disagree with a leading commentator’s statement that “the 
manufactured housing regulations at issue in Walker were not based upon statutes which 
in and of themselves described violations of § 75-1.1.” ALLEN, supra note 1, § 9.04, at 9-34 
to -36; see also id. (“[T]he result [in Walker] could be different if the regulation(s) at 
issue in a case have been promulgated pursuant to statutory authority that adequately 
proscribes unfair or deceptive practices by licensees.”). 
 149. Noble, 199 N.C. App. at 170 n.3, 681 S.E.2d at 454 n.3; see Winston Realty Co. v. 
G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 98–99, 313 S.E.2d 677, 681–82 (1985). The court’s citation of 
Winston Realty is surprising as well, because Winston Realty does not apply per se analysis. 
See supra notes 112–20 and accompanying text. 
 150. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-47.6. 
 151. See id. A separate section of the statute, however, does direct the commissioner of 
labor to deny a license to a placement service whose principals have engaged in “deceptive 
or unfair practices in the conduct of business.” Id. § 95-47.2(d)(3)(b)(4). 
 152. See Walker, 362 N.C. at 71, 653 S.E.2d at 399; Noble, 199 N.C. App. at 170–71, 681 
S.E.2d at 454–55. 
 153. See Walker, 362 N.C. at 71, 653 S.E.2d at 399; Noble, 199 N.C. App. at 171, 681 
S.E.2d at 455. 
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opinions. The opinions themselves do not expressly analyze the 
statutes or otherwise announce standards for upgrading. 
In sum, the current standards for selective upgrading in North 
Carolina are ambiguous. The case law to date leaves many of these 
ambiguities unresolved. 
2.  Questionable Distinctions 
To be sure, not every aspect of the standards for selective 
upgrading is ambiguous. Even the clearly stated reasoning, however, 
rests on questionable distinctions. 
For example, Walker holds directly that a violation of a 
regulation issued by a licensing agency does not state a per se 
violation of section 75-1.1.154 To explain this conclusion, the supreme 
court implied that licensing regulations are less fit for upgrading than 
the insurance statute in Gray was.155 On closer review, however, these 
predicate violations seem parallel. Under both the statutes in Gray 
and the regulations in Walker, state officials can use administrative 
proceedings as an enforcement method.156 Also, one of the statutes 
that underlies the regulations in Walker allows a state agency to deny 
a license when an applicant has used “unfair methods of competition 
or [has] committ[ed] unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”157 
To defend the holding in Walker, one might argue that a 
predicate statute reflects a legislative decision to condemn certain 
types of conduct, whereas a regulation is produced by unelected 
decision-makers.158 This distinction between statutes and regulations, 
 
 154. Walker, 362 N.C. at 64, 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 395, 398–99; see supra notes 70–78 and 
accompanying text (analyzing Walker). 
 155. See Walker, 362 N.C. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 398–99; Gray v. N.C. Ins. 
Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 71, 529 S.E.2d 676, 683 (2000). This discussion in Walker 
implies that Gray is a per se decision. As shown above, that implication is mistaken. See 
supra notes 103–11 and accompanying text. 
 156. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-63-20 to -50 (providing administrative remedies 
for the statutes in Gray), with id. § 143-143.13(a), (c) (providing administrative remedies 
for the statutes and rules in Walker). 
 157. Id. § 143-143.13(a)(7). 
  Ken-Mar Finance v. Harvey, 90 N.C. App. 362, 368 S.E.2d 646 (1988), is 
perplexing for similar reasons. The court of appeals stated in dicta that a violation of the 
FTC’s Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4) (2013), “would not . . . constitute a 
per se violation of G.S. 75-1.1.” Ken-Mar, 90 N.C. App. at 367, 368 S.E.2d at 650. Like the 
regulation at issue in Walker, however, the regulation in Ken-Mar states that particular 
practices are unfair and deceptive. See 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4). 
 158. See, e.g., David Arkush, Democracy and Administrative Legitimacy, 47 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 611, 611–12 (2012) (“Agency officials write laws of general applicability 
but lack the political accountability of elected legislators. . . . At the same time, the 
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however, played no stated role in the Walker opinion.159 Indeed, the 
supreme court implicitly rejected this distinction when it disapproved 
a per se violation based on the statutes at issue.160 As these points 
show, the holding in Walker rests on a questionable distinction 
between licensing regulations and other predicate violations. 
Other decisions on selective upgrading are likewise questionable. 
The case law on upgrading of intentional torts, in particular, is a 
thicket of inconsistent outcomes.161 Some intentional torts, such as 
defamation, state per se violations of section 75-1.1;162 others, such as 
conversion, do not.163 The decisions in this area do not acknowledge 
these varying outcomes, let alone explain them. 
As these examples show, the selective-upgrading opinions 
contain ambiguous standards and unconvincing applications of those 
standards. 
C. The Ambiguity of “as a Matter of Law” 
The phrase “as a matter of law” has further tangled the 
relationship between predicate violations and section 75-1.1. In the 
context of section 75-1.1, this phrase has two meanings, only one of 
which denotes a per se violation. This dual meaning of “as a matter of 
law,” combined with the frequent use of the phrase in decisions under 
section 75-1.1, has led courts to misinterpret non-per-se decisions as 
per se decisions. 
1.  The Two Meanings of “as a Matter of Law” in This Context 
In decisions on section 75-1.1, courts use the phrase “as a matter 
of law” to convey two different points. 
First, courts sometimes use this phrase to report that they are 
upgrading a predicate violation to a per se violation of section 75-1.1. 
For example, the North Carolina Court of Appeals used “as a matter 
 
administrative process is often inaccessible to the public, . . . and the public lacks tools to 
assess adequately the quality of regulatory policies and outcomes.”). 
 159. See Walker, 362 N.C. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 398–99. Indeed, a leading 
commentator has argued that “[Walker] did not necessarily remove all regulatory 
violations from the list of per se unfair or deceptive business practices.” ALLEN, supra 
note 1, § 9.04, at 9-35. 
 160. See Walker, 362 N.C. at 71, 653 S.E.2d at 399; see also supra notes 70–78 and 
accompanying text (analyzing this aspect of Walker). 
 161. See generally ALLEN, supra note 1, § 19.02[3], at 19-11 to -19 (discussing the 
relationship between several intentional torts and section 75-1.1). 
 162. See, e.g., Exclaim Mktg., LLC v. DIRECTV, Inc., No. 5:11-CV-684-FL, 2012 WL 
3023429, at *9 (E.D.N.C. July 24, 2012). 
 163. See, e.g., Hancock v. Renshaw, 421 B.R. 738, 744 (M.D.N.C. 2009). 
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of law” with this meaning in State ex rel. Edmisten v. Zim Chemical 
Co.164 The defendant in Zim violated a statute that prohibited the 
misbranding of antifreeze.165 The court wrote: “[T]he failure to label 
the drums [of antifreeze] properly is statutorily deemed to be a 
misbranding, which we in turn declare to be deceptive as a matter of 
law.”166 The court did not analyze the usual conduct standard for 
deception under section 75-1.1; instead, it simply upgraded the 
violation of the misbranding statute to a per se violation of section 75-
1.1. It used the phrase “as a matter of law” to state this conclusion.167 
Second, and in contrast, courts often use “as a matter of law” to 
state that the presence or absence of a section 75-1.1 violation is a 
question of law for the court, rather than a jury question.168 Country 
Club of Johnston County v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.169 
illustrates this use of the phrase. The court of appeals stated: “[T]he 
trial court determined, as a matter of law, that [the defendant’s] acts 
constituted a violation of [section] 75-1.1.”170 Here, “as a matter of 
law” described the trial court’s decision-making process, not the 
 
 164. 45 N.C. App. 604, 263 S.E.2d 849 (1980). 
 165. See id. at 606–07, 263 S.E.2d at 851. The misbranding statute in Zim, N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 106-571 (1974), is now codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-579.6 (2013). 
 166. Zim, 45 N.C. App. at 608, 263 S.E.2d at 852 (emphasis added). 
 167. For further examples of this pattern, see, for example, ABT Bldg. Prods. Corp. v. 
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 472 F.3d 99, 125 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating that a 
violation of section 58-63-15(11)(f) constitutes a violation of section 75-1.1 “as a matter of 
law” because such a violation is “inherently unfair”); Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 
5 F. App’x 111, 115 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[C]onduct that violates § 58-63-15(11)(f) constitutes a 
violation of § 75-1.1 as a matter of law.”). 
 168. When courts use the phrase “as a matter of law” with this meaning, they often cite 
the seminal case on judges’ and juries’ roles under section 75-1.1: Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 
303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975). See, e.g., Atl. Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 
712, 715 (4th Cir. 1983); United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 485 F. Supp. 1049, 
1058–59 (E.D.N.C. 1980), aff’d, 649 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1981); Ford v. All-Dry of the 
Carolinas, Inc., No. COA10-931, 2011 WL 1483726, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2011) 
(unpublished). 
  In Hardy, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held: “Ordinarily it would be for 
the jury to determine the facts, and based on the jury’s finding, the court would then 
determine, as a matter of law, whether the defendant engaged in unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.” 288 N.C. at 310, 218 S.E.2d at 346–47. 
  Although Hardy largely uses the phrase “as a matter of law” to describe judges’ 
role under section 75-1.1, it also uses that phrase to express a per se violation. See id. at 
311, 218 S.E.2d at 347. The fact that even this seminal opinion uses “as a matter of law” 
with two meanings highlights the ambiguity of this phrase. 
 169. 150 N.C. App. 231, 563 S.E.2d 269 (2002). 
 170. Id. at 246, 563 S.E.2d at 279 (emphasis added). To reinforce this meaning, the 
court of appeals stated: “[T]he determination of whether an act or practice is an unfair or 
deceptive practice that violates N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 is a question of law for the 
court . . . .” Id. (citing Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 68, 529 S.E.2d 
676, 681 (2000)). 
CITE AS 92 N.C. L. REV. 1881 (2014) 
2014] PER SE UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES  1917 
 
dispositive significance of a predicate violation. In fact, a key issue in 
the case was whether the absence of a predicate violation barred 
liability under section 75-1.1.171 
In sum, although the phrase “as a matter of law” can report a per 
se violation of section 75-1.1, it can also just summarize the role of 
judges in litigation under the statute. 
2.  Slippage in the Meaning of “as a Matter of Law” 
Unsurprisingly, courts’ use of the phrase “as a matter of law” to 
mean two different things has caused confusion in decisions under 
section 75-1.1. 
The most notable instances of this confusion involve Gray v. 
North Carolina Insurance Underwriting Ass’n.172 As shown above, 
Gray does not apply per se analysis.173 Nevertheless, several courts 
have cited Gray to support per se holdings in later cases.174 
A recent federal decision illustrates this type of error. In 
Guessford v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co.,175 
the court used the “as a matter of law” language in Gray to support a 
per se violation of section 75-1.1.176 Citing Gray, the Guessford court 
stated: “[I]f Plaintiff can prove that Defendant acted in a way that 
violated [section] 58-63-15(11) . . . then Plaintiff will be able to 
establish his [section 75-1.1] claim . . . .”177 This per se reasoning is a 
long distance from Gray itself, a non-per-se decision in which the 
court used “as a matter of law” to describe the judge’s role in a 
section 75-1.1 case.178 
 
 171. See id. at 243–44, 563 S.E.2d at 277–78 (analyzing this question and answering it in 
the negative). 
 172. 352 N.C. 61, 529 S.E.2d 676 (2000). 
 173. See id. at 67, 529 S.E.2d at 680; supra notes 103–11 and accompanying text. 
 174. See infra notes 175–78 and accompanying text. 
 175. 983 F. Supp. 2d 652 (M.D.N.C. 2013). 
 176. Id. at 660. 
 177. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Gray, 352 N.C. at 74–75, 529 S.E.2d at 684–85). The 
court also misread Country Club as a per se decision. See id. As noted above, Country 
Club did not involve a predicate violation at all, so it could not involve upgrading a 
predicate violation to a violation of section 75-1.1. See Country Club of Johnston Cnty. v. 
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 150 N.C. App. 231, 243–44, 563 S.E.2d 269, 277–78 (2002); supra 
notes 169–71 and accompanying text. 
 178. See Gray, 352 N.C. at 71, 529 S.E.2d at 683; see also supra notes 103–11 and 
accompanying text (explaining the reasoning in Gray). 
  For similar misreadings of Gray, see, for example, ABT Bldg. Prods. Corp. v. 
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 472 F.3d 99, 125 (4th Cir. 2006) (“In North 
Carolina, a violation of section 58-63-15(11)(f) . . . constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade 
practice under [section 75-1.1], as a matter of law. . . . Because the evidence supports the 
jury’s finding that National Union engaged in conduct violating section 58-63-
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Winston Realty,179 likewise, has been misread as a per se case 
because it uses the phrase “as a matter of law.” The court in Winston 
Realty reviewed the evidence and applied the usual conduct standard 
under section 75-1.1—steps that a per se analysis would not involve.180 
In Noble,181 however, the North Carolina Court of Appeals cited 
Winston Realty for the following proposition: “[V]iolations of certain 
regulatory statutes are per se violations of [section] 75-1.1.”182 Even 
more recently, in Weber, Hodges & Godwin,183 the court of appeals 
cited Winston Realty for the proposition that “[v]iolations of 
regulatory statutes can constitute per se unfair acts” that violate 
section 75-1.1.184 In both decisions, the court of appeals recounted the 
passage in Winston Realty that uses the phrase “as a matter of law.”185 
As these cases illustrate, the ambiguous phrase “as a matter of 
law” has compounded the problems with per se theories and related 
theories under section 75-1.1. 
IV.  REFINING PER SE THEORIES UNDER SECTION 75-1.1 
As part III of this Article shows, the standards for per se 
violations and similar violations of section 75-1.1 are in disarray. This 
part IV proposes three solutions to these problems. Section IV(A) 
lays out two relatively simple solutions. Section IV(B) lays out a 
third, more ambitious, one. As shown below, the North Carolina 
courts can and should adopt all three solutions. 
 
15(11)(f) . . . and because such a violation is ‘inherently unfair’ and a violation of [section 
75-1.1], the district court’s ruling that National Union violated [section 75-1.1] was not 
erroneous.” (citing Gray, 352 N.C. at 70, 529 S.E.2d at 683)); Walker v. Fleetwood Homes 
of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 70–71, 653 S.E.2d 393, 398–99 (2007) (noting that “this Court 
has previously held that violations of some statutes, such as those concerning the insurance 
industry, can constitute unfair and deceptive trade practices as a matter of law” (citing 
Gray, 352 N.C. at 71, 529 S.E.2d at 683), then stating that in Gray the court had discerned 
“the General Assembly’s intent to equate a violation of [a predicate] statute with the more 
general provision of § 75-1.1” (emphasis added)); Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), 
LLC, 199 N.C. App. 163, 170, 681 S.E.2d 448, 454 (2009) (citing Gray, 352 N.C. at 71, 529 
S.E.2d at 683, for the proposition that “North Carolina appellate courts have held that 
violations of certain regulatory statutes are per se violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1”). 
 179. Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 97, 331 S.E.2d 677, 681 (1985). 
 180. See id. at 97–98, 331 S.E.2d at 681–82; supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 181. Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), LLC, 199 N.C. App. 163, 681 S.E.2d 448 
(2009). 
 182. Id. at 170, 681 S.E.2d at 454. The court cited Gray for the same proposition. Id. 
 183. Weber Hodges & Godwin Commercial Real Estate Servs., LLC v. Hartley, No. 
COA13-207, 2013 WL 4716368 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2013) (unpublished). 
 184. Id. at *4. 
 185. See id. (quoting Winston Realty, 314 N.C. at 98–99, 331 S.E.2d at 677); Noble, 199 
N.C. App. at 170, 681 S.E.2d at 454 (paraphrasing Winston Realty). 
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A. Two Easy Solutions: Avoiding Ambiguous Holdings and “Split 
the Difference” Decisions 
Two straightforward solutions would address some of the 
analytical problems with per se violations of section 75-1.1. 
First, courts should avoid stating their conclusions in ambiguous 
phrases like “as a matter of law” and “may be.” As shown above, 
these phrases obscure the meaning of opinions under section 75-1.1.186 
They also promote slippage from one decision to another, where 
ambiguous phrasing causes narrow precedents to be misunderstood in 
later cases.187 
Second, courts should disown the near relatives of per se 
violations. No decision to date explains when the various near 
relatives apply, or why these variations even exist.188 In addition, 
when many of the near-relative decisions describe how predicate 
violations affect section 75-1.1 claims, the decisions say, in essence, “it 
depends.”189 Holdings like these give future courts no reference points 
to guide their analysis.190 
These problems call for abandoning the near relatives outright. 
To decide the relationship between a predicate violation and section 
75-1.1, courts should choose between two options: (1) recognizing a 
per se violation or (2) applying the regular conduct standards under 
section 75-1.1. 
Requiring a choice between those two options is likely, over 
time, to strengthen North Carolina doctrine on upgrading. Gray 
illustrates the opportunities for improvement. The parties in that case 
debated difficult questions on per se liability: whether a predicate 
violation that was missing a key element, and that involved a 
statutory disclaimer of a private cause of action, could nonetheless 
establish a per se violation of section 75-1.1.191 A near-relative 
analysis, however, led the Supreme Court of North Carolina to avoid 
these questions. The court did not find a per se violation, but it still 
held that a predicate violation could be an “example[] of conduct to 
 
 186. See supra notes 119–28, 164–85 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra notes 123–28, 172–85 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra notes 93–137 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra notes 99–100, 111, 123–28, 131–36 and accompanying text. 
 190. In contrast, if courts adopt the analysis proposed below, they will have extensive 
reference points: decisions, statements, and scholarship on section 5. See infra notes 225–
34 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text. 
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support a finding of unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”192 If earlier 
decisions had ruled out this type of difference splitting, the court 
might well have analyzed the upgrading issues that the case 
presented.193 Further, if Gray had addressed upgrading, the supreme 
court’s guidance would have eased the courts’ struggles in later per se 
cases.194 
B. Tackling the Bigger Challenge: Except in Cases of Explicit or 
Semi-Explicit Upgrading, Apply the “Public Policy” Aspect of the 
Unfairness Doctrine 
At the same time that courts take the steps described above, they 
should address the core problem with per se violations of section 75-
1.1: the murky standards for upgrading predicate violations. 
This subsection of the Article proposes that courts limit per se 
violations to cases of explicit or semi-explicit upgrading. Outside of 
these cases, courts should instead apply the unfairness doctrine under 
section 75-1.1. To apply this doctrine, courts should consult an 
accepted source of law under section 75-1.1: the law under section 5 
of the FTC Act. Section 5 doctrine defines the violations of external 
norms that transgress public policy and thus are unfair. 
1.  Limiting Per Se Violations to Cases of Explicit or Semi-Explicit 
Upgrading 
As shown above, North Carolina courts have struggled to decide 
when to upgrade predicate violations that have no stated connection 
with section 75-1.1. It is time to abandon this struggle. Instead, the 
courts should recognize per se violations only in cases of explicit 
upgrading or semi-explicit upgrading.195 Limiting per se violations to 
these cases makes sense for several reasons. 
 
 192. Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 71, 529 S.E.2d 676, 683 (2000); 
see id. at 67, 529 S.E.2d at 680 (“Plaintiffs contend that defendant violated [the predicate 
statute] constituting a violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 and that defendant violated N.C.G.S. 
§ 75-1.1 separate from and not based upon a violation of [the predicate statute]. We agree 
with plaintiffs’ latter contention.”). 
 193. See supra notes 104–11 and accompanying text. 
 194. Later courts have been unsure how close Gray comes to recognizing a per se 
violation. See supra notes 174–78 and accompanying text. They have also had trouble 
applying the upgrading standards in Gray. See, e.g., Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), 
LLC, 199 N.C. App. 163, 170, 681 S.E.2d 448, 454 (2009) (synthesizing Gray and other 
decisions by stating that courts recognize per se violations “only where the regulatory 
statute [that makes up the predicate violation] specifically defines and proscribes conduct 
which is unfair or deceptive within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1”). 
 195. See supra text accompanying notes 44–51 (defining and discussing these forms of 
upgrading). 
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First, upgrading involves high stakes. When a court upgrades a 
predicate violation, that decision, in one stroke, satisfies the conduct 
standard under section 75-1.1.196 Upgrading turns a claim that allows 
single damages into one that generates automatic treble damages and 
possible attorney fees.197 Indeed, upgrading can produce this effect 
even when a predicate violation lacks any private right of action of its 
own.198 The law should not produce these case-changing results based 
on weak standards. 
Second, the standards for selective upgrading currently lack 
rigor. As shown above, decisions on selective upgrading suffer from 
ambiguous language and questionable distinctions.199 Indeed, it is not 
even clear whether the two current standards for selective upgrading 
are cumulative or alternative.200 
Third, treating explicit and semi-explicit upgrading more 
favorably than selective upgrading is only logical. In cases of explicit 
upgrading, the General Assembly has already stated that a violation 
of a given statute or regulation is a violation of section 75-1.1.201 Semi-
explicit upgrading has an equally strong legislative basis. When a 
statute or regulation calls misconduct in a particular context unfair or 
deceptive, there can be little doubt that the lawmakers equate that 
misconduct with a violation of section 75-1.1.202 
Fourth, courts need not engage in selective upgrading to define 
the relationship between predicate violations and section 75-1.1. 
Instead, they can apply a non-per-se analysis: the unfairness doctrine 
 
 196. See supra notes 7–9, 37 and accompanying text (defining a per se violation as one 
that has this effect). 
 197. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-16, -16.1(1) (2013). 
 198. See, e.g., Guessford v. Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 652, 660 
(M.D.N.C. 2013) (noting that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-15(11) creates no private right of 
action, but then stating: “[I]f Plaintiff can prove that Defendant acted in a way that 
violated § 58-63-15(11), and that he suffered an actual injury proximately caused by that 
violation, then Plaintiff will be able to establish his [section 75-1.1] claim and thereby may 
seek treble damages arising from the alleged [section 75-1.1] violation”); see also id. at 666 
(applying this per se theory and granting offensive summary judgment on a plaintiff’s 
claim under section 75-1.1). 
 199. See supra notes 140–63 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra notes 147–57 and accompanying text. 
 201. See CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 11, § 3.2.6, at 181 (“Such language leaves no 
room for doubt about the availability of a UDAP cause of action . . . .”); see also ALLEN, 
supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-8 n.22 (listing statutes with cross-references to section 75-1.1). 
 202. See, e.g., Dickson v. Rucho, 366 N.C. 332, 341, 737 S.E.2d 362, 369 (2013) (“It is 
always presumed that the Legislature acted with full knowledge of prior and existing law.” 
(quoting Ridge Cmty. Investors, Inc. v. Berry, 293 N.C. 688, 695, 239 S.E.2d 566, 570 
(1977))); see also CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 11, § 3.2.7.4.1, at 190 (“If a statute says 
that it was enacted to prevent unfair and deceptive acts, then surely a violation is a UDAP 
violation.”). 
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under section 75-1.1.203 As shown below, an aspect of the unfairness 
doctrine—the rule that violations of an established public policy are 
unfair—already provides standards for the relationship between 
predicate violations and section 75-1.1.204 
2.  Replacing Selective Upgrading with the Public-Policy Aspect of 
Unfairness 
In the absence of explicit or semi-explicit upgrading, courts 
should not apply per se analysis or any of its variants. Instead, they 
should ask whether the conduct that establishes a predicate violation 
satisfies the test for unfairness under section 75-1.1.205 
The unfairness test, after all, already refers to predicate statutes 
and other external standards. One part of the test asks whether a 
defendant’s conduct “offends public policy as it has been established 
by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—whether, in other words, it 
is within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or 
other established concept of unfairness.”206 
When North Carolina courts apply this public-policy aspect of 
unfairness, they need not do so without guidance. Pronouncements 
under section 5 of the FTC—the statute on which section 75-1.1 is 
based—define the violations of external sources of public policy that 
rise to the level of unfairness.207 
As shown below, replacing selective upgrading with the public-
policy test for unfairness will make the problems with selective 
upgrading moot. This approach will also give the courts more chances 
to apply, and thus refine, the public-policy analysis itself. 
a.  The Public-Policy Aspect of the North Carolina Test for 
Unfairness 
Section 75-1.1, of course, allows for more than per se 
violations.208 Case law on the widest-ranging aspect of section 75-1.1—
 
 203. See generally Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 2050–52 (describing the key 
features of the unfairness doctrine under section 75-1.1). 
 204. See infra notes 208–20 and accompanying text. 
 205. See infra notes 206–07, 236–45 and accompanying text. 
 206. Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 263 n.6, 266 S.E.2d 610, 621 
n.6 (1980) (emphasis added) (quoting FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 
n.5 (1972)), overruled on other grounds by Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, 
Inc., 323 N.C. 559, 374 S.E.2d 385 (1988). 
 207. See infra notes 221–34 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (listing the major types of section 75-1.1 
violations). 
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unfairness—refers to sources of law outside section 75-1.1, under the 
heading of public policy. 
The relevant part of the North Carolina definition of unfairness 
states that a “practice is unfair when it offends established public 
policy.”209 No North Carolina decisions, however, define the public 
policies that support a violation of section 75-1.1. Indeed, most 
decisions address the public-policy aspect of unfairness only 
summarily.210 
Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), LLC211 illustrates this 
pattern. The plaintiffs alleged that a bar served them and their 
companion an excessive number of drinks, resulting in a drunk-
driving accident.212 They claimed that the bar violated North Carolina 
alcohol statutes and related regulations.213 They went on to argue that 
these violations supported a section 75-1.1 violation because, among 
other reasons,214 the bar’s actions “offend[ed] established public 
policy.”215 The North Carolina Court of Appeals, however, did not 
analyze whether the alcohol statutes and regulations announced a 
public policy that could support a section 75-1.1 violation. The court 
stated only that the one case that the plaintiffs cited was not on 
 
 209. E.g., Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 367 N.C. 81, 91, 747 S.E.2d 220, 228 (2013) 
(quoting Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 72, 653 S.E.2d 393, 399 
(2007)). This public-policy aspect of unfairness under section 75-1.1 has existed since 1980. 
See Johnson, 300 N.C. at 263, 266 S.E.2d at 621, quoted supra text accompanying note 206. 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court of North Carolina described the public-policy aspect of 
unfairness by quoting an FTC definition of unfairness under section 5. See Johnson, 300 
N.C. at 262–64, 266 S.E.2d at 620–21 (citing, among other decisions, FTC v. Sperry & 
Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972)); Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 2057–
63 (describing the history of this test in FTC doctrine); see also infra notes 221–34 and 
accompanying text (recommending using section 5 doctrine to shape the public-policy test 
under section 75-1.1). 
 210. See infra notes 252–64 and accompanying text. In fact, the public-policy aspect of 
unfairness under section 75-1.1 is currently applied so rarely that the leading treatise on 
section 75-1.1 mentions it only briefly. See ALLEN, supra note 1, § 19.02, at 19-4 to -5. 
 211. 199 N.C. App. 163, 170, 681 S.E.2d 448, 454 (2009). 
 212. Id. at 164–65, 681 S.E.2d at 450–51. 
 213. Id. at 169–70, 681 S.E.2d at 453–54. 
 214. The plaintiffs also argued that the violations of the alcohol statutes and 
regulations established a per se violation of section 75-1.1. See id. at 167–71, 681 S.E.2d at 
452–55; see also supra notes 145–46, 149–53 and accompanying text (discussing the per se 
analysis in Noble). 
 215. Noble, 199 N.C. App. at 172, 681 S.E.2d at 455. In addition to seeking the 
enhanced remedies associated with a section 75-1.1 claim, the plaintiffs apparently 
pursued a section 75-1.1 claim to avoid the defense of contributory negligence. See id.; see 
also Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 96, 331 S.E.2d 677, 681 (1985) 
(holding that contributory negligence is not a defense under section 75-1.1). 
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point.216 Thus, Noble, like other similar decisions,217 does not establish 
standards to decide which violations of public policy show unfairness. 
In two other decisions, the court of appeals has held that 
violations of a North Carolina usury statute establish a public-policy-
based violation of section 75-1.1.218 In both cases, however, the court 
had an unusually easy path to this conclusion. The usury statute 
provides that “[i]t is the paramount public policy of North Carolina to 
protect North Carolina resident borrowers through the application of 
North Carolina interest laws.”219 In view of this express statutory 
language, the court did not discuss how it would analyze less graphic 
expressions of public policy.220 
 
 216. See Noble, 199 N.C. App. at 172, 681 S.E.2d at 455. The decision that the plaintiffs 
cited did not address liability under section 75-1.1. Instead, it held that a bar’s negligence 
supported liability under a North Carolina alcohol statute. See Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 
N.C. App. 1, 12, 303 S.E.2d 584, 591 (1983), cited in Noble, 199 N.C. App. at 172, 681 
S.E.2d at 455. 
 217. See, e.g., Spinks v. Taylor, 303 N.C. 256, 265, 278 S.E.2d 501, 506 (1981) (“We 
cannot say that defendant’s padlocking procedures offend ‘established public policy’ . . . .” 
(quoting Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 263, 266 S.E.2d 610, 621 
(1980), overruled on other grounds by Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 
323 N.C. 559, 374 S.E.2d 385 (1988))); Adams v. Jones, 114 N.C. App. 256, 259, 441 S.E.2d 
699, 700 (1994) (holding, without explanation, that an agreement produced by extortion 
not only was “void as against public policy,” but also violated the public-policy aspect of 
the unfairness doctrine under section 75-1.1). 
  The leading decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court on the public-policy 
aspect of unfairness, Stanley v. Moore, 339 N.C. 717, 454 S.E.2d 225 (1995), likewise 
analyzes the policy behind the relevant statute only summarily. The statute at issue in 
Stanley contained an explicit declaration of public policy. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-25.6 
(2013), quoted in Stanley, 339 N.C. at 724, 454 S.E.2d at 229. Thus, the supreme court was 
able to conclude easily that the statute “embodies the public policy of this state, as 
determined by the legislature, that residential tenants not be evicted through self-help 
measures without resort to judicial process.” Stanley, 339 N.C. at 724, 454 S.E.2d at 228–
29. 
  In fact, Stanley did not actually decide whether the predicate statute supported 
liability under section 75-1.1. The court of appeals had already found a violation of section 
75-1.1. Stanley v. Moore, 113 N.C. App. 523, 525–26, 439 S.E.2d 250, 252 (1994), rev’d, 339 
N.C. 717, 454 S.E.2d 339 (1995). It had concluded, however, that a remedy-limiting 
provision in the predicate statute barred the courts from awarding treble damages or 
attorney fees based on the section 75-1.1 claim. Id. at 527, 439 S.E.2d at 252–53. That 
remedial limit was the only conclusion that the plaintiff appealed further, so it was the 
only conclusion that the supreme court could review and reverse. See Stanley, 339 N.C. at 
720, 454 S.E.2d at 226–27. 
 218. See Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 192 N.C. App. 298, 319–20, 665 S.E.2d 767, 780–81 
(2008); State ex rel. Cooper v. NCCS Loans, Inc., 174 N.C. App. 630, 641, 624 S.E.2d 371, 
378 (2005). 
 219. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2.1(g). 
 220. See Odell, 192 N.C. App. at 319–20, 665 S.E.2d at 780–81; NCCS Loans, 174 N.C. 
App. at 641, 624 S.E.2d at 378. 
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As these cases illustrate, the public-policy aspect of unfairness 
has the potential to take over the function of selective upgrading: 
identifying sources of law that do not refer to section 75-1.1, but still 
establish a section 75-1.1 violation. In North Carolina, however, the 
public-policy theory has suffered from a lack of standards. The next 
subsection of this Article identifies a source of standards that will 
improve the public-policy theory (both in its own right and as a 
replacement for selective upgrading). 
b.  Section 5 Standards on Public Policy 
To find standards to guide the public-policy analysis under 
section 75-1.1, courts can turn to an already accepted source of law: 
doctrine under section 5. 
As noted above, section 75-1.1 shares its substantive language 
with section 5.221 Courts in North Carolina have long cited the parallel 
language of the two statutes as a reason to take guidance from section 
5 authorities.222 For example, in a seminal decision on section 75-1.1, 
Marshall v. Miller,223 the Supreme Court of North Carolina called it 
“established” that “federal decisions interpreting the FTC Act may 
be used as guidance in determining the scope and meaning of G.S. 75-
1.1.”224 
A key FTC pronouncement under section 5 clarifies the role of 
public policy in the unfairness doctrine, as well as the types of public 
policy that can play that role. In a 1980 statement on unfairness, the 
FTC announced that it would treat violations of external sources of 
public policy as “additional evidence on the degree of consumer 
injury caused by specific practices.”225 
 
 221. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 222. See, e.g., Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 308, 218 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1975); Sykes v. 
Health Network Solutions, Inc., No. 13 CVS 2595, 2013 WL 6410591, at *3 (N.C. Bus. Ct. 
Dec. 5, 2013); see also Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 2066–68 (discussing other 
decisions to the same effect). 
 223. 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981). 
 224. Id. at 542, 276 S.E.2d at 399. In an earlier article, Kip Nelson and I have urged 
North Carolina courts to use this authority and to seek guidance from section 5 authorities 
on the meaning of unfairness under section 75-1.1. Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 
2070–82. 
 225. Letter from the FTC to Sens. Ford & Danforth (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in Int’l 
Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070, 1075 (1984) [hereinafter 1980 Statement, with 
pinpoint citations to the reprint in International Harvester]; see, e.g., Remarks of 
Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga Before the Third International Conference on 
Consumer Law (Mar. 11, 1992), reprinted in [1985–1997 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 50,076, at 48,790 (describing the changes brought about by the 1980 Statement); 
Letter from the FTC to Sens. Packwood and Kasten (Mar. 5, 1982), reprinted in 42 
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1055, at 568, 570 (Mar. 11, 1982) (same; 
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When one considers substitutes for selective upgrading, however, 
the more notable part of the 1980 Statement is its discussion of when 
violations of public policy independently suffice to show unfairness. 
The 1980 Statement lays out the following principles: 
 
•  Violations of external sources of public policy can 
independently show unfairness only “when the policy is so 
clear that it will entirely determine the question of consumer 
injury. . . . In these cases the legislature or court, in 
announcing the policy, has already determined that such 
injury does exist and thus [consumer injury] need not be 
expressly proved in each instance.”226 
 
•  To qualify as a standard for unfairness, a public “policy 
should be declared or embodied in formal sources such as 
statutes, judicial decisions, or the Constitution as interpreted 
by the courts, rather than being ascertained from the general 
sense of the national values.”227 
 
•  “The policy should likewise be one that is widely shared, and 
not the isolated decision of a single state or a single court.”228 
 
containing no reference to public policy as an independent basis for finding unfairness); J. 
Howard Beales III, Director, Bureau of Consumer Prot., Fed. Trade Comm’n, The FTC’s 
Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and Resurrection, 22 J. PUB. POL’Y & 
MARKETING 192, 193 (2003) (discussing the history of the 1980 Statement); Stephen 
Calkins, FTC Unfairness: An Essay, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1935, 1952–54 (2000) (same). 
 226. 1980 Statement, supra note 225, at 1075. 
 227. Id. at 1076. As this language implies, the 1980 Statement ends the practice of 
finding unfairness based on the penumbra of a statute, regulation, or judge-made theory. 
See David L. Belt, Should the FTC’s Current Criteria for Determining “Unfair Acts or 
Practices” Be Applied to State “Little FTC Acts”?, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 3 (Feb. 2010), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Feb10_Belt2_25
f.authcheckdam.pdf (noting this effect of the 1980 Statement); see also id. at 10 (“The 
difficulty of determining or explaining to a jury the boundaries of the ‘penumbra’ of an 
‘established concept of unfairness’ [is] obvious.”); cf. Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. 
Co., 300 N.C. 247, 263 n.6, 266 S.E.2d 610, 621 n.6 (1980) (quoting the FTC’s pre-1980 
definition of unfairness, including its reference to penumbras), overruled on other grounds 
by Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 323 N.C. 559, 374 S.E.2d 385 (1988). 
  A Maryland decision illustrates the effects of rejecting this penumbral version of 
the public-policy theory. See Legg v. Castruccio, 642 A.2d 906, 918–19 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1994). In Legg, Maryland’s intermediate appellate court decided to follow the FTC’s 1980 
Statement as the standard for unfairness under Maryland’s section 5 analogue. See id. at 
917–18 & n.5. Applying this standard, the court rejected an argument that even though 
certain regulatory statutes did not apply by their own terms, they could support a public-
policy-based claim of unfairness. See id. at 918–20. 
 228. 1980 Statement, supra note 225, at 1076; see Calkins, supra note 225, at 1955. 
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•  Finally, to qualify as a standard for unfairness, a policy 
should be unambiguous.229 
 
Applying these principles, the FTC has accepted public-policy 
theories that have a firm grounding in state and federal decisions and 
statutes.230 It has rejected theories that rely on ephemeral sources of 
law231 or sources of law that do not apply to the conduct at issue.232 
In sum, the 1980 Statement offers a helpful standard for 
predicate violations that show unfairness: violations that are 
convincingly recognized as unambiguous evidence of unjustified 
injury to consumers.233 Given the North Carolina courts’ history of 
looking to section 5 authorities to define section 75-1.1, the 1980 
Statement is a logical source of standards to flesh out the public-
policy analysis under section 75-1.1.234 
 
 229. See 1980 Statement, supra note 225, at 1075–76 (stating twice that a public policy, 
to suffice to show unfairness, should be clear); Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair 
Acts or Practices” in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 GEO. L.J. 225, 278 
(1981) (summarizing this aspect of the 1980 Statement as follows: “Finally, an enforceable 
public policy must be relatively specific. It must grant certain rights or prohibit certain 
practices in terms that are free from ambiguity.”). 
 230. See, e.g., FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009) (affirming 
liability under section 5 when a defendant subverted the privacy safeguards in 
Telecommunications Act § 222, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012)); Horizon Corp., 97 F.T.C. 464, 851 
& n.73 (1981) (holding, based on U.C.C. § 2-302 and “a developing trend in state and 
federal law,” 97 F.T.C. at 851, that forfeiture clauses in land-sale contracts violate the 
public-policy aspect of unfairness); see also Amrep Corp., 102 F.T.C. 1362, 1668–69 (1983) 
(following the reasoning in Horizon), aff’d, 768 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 231. See, e.g., Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. 263, 332 (1986) (rejecting the 
argument that state enforcers’ decisions not to take action against Orkin’s conduct showed 
a public policy that barred an unfairness claim by the FTC), aff’d, 849 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir. 
1988). 
 232. See, e.g., Beltone Elecs. Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68, 219–20 (1982) (rejecting the claim 
that the physician-patient privilege established a public policy that barred Beltone from 
turning over customers’ names from terminated hearing-aid dealers to successor dealers or 
other businesses). 
 233. See 1980 Statement, supra note 225, at 1075–76; see also Belt, supra note 227, at 11 
(“By requiring public policy to be clear and well-established before it could provide an 
independent basis for a finding of unfairness . . . , the [1980 Statement] removed significant 
potential ambiguity from the criteria for determining unfairness.”). 
 234. See, e.g., Henderson v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 346 N.C. 741, 749, 488 S.E.2d 234, 
239 (1997) (noting that section 75-1.1 “is patterned after section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, and we look to federal case law for guidance in interpreting the 
statute”); see also Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 2065–68 (analyzing the relationship 
between section 5 and section 75-1.1). 
  In 1994, Congress codified most of the 1980 Statement in a new subsection (n) of 
section 5. That subsection further narrows the role of public policy as a basis for unfairness 
enforcement. Under subsection 5(n), “public policy considerations may not serve as a 
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C. Benefits of the Suggested Approach 
To solve the problems with selective upgrading, this Article 
recommends that courts recognize per se violations of section 75-1.1 
only in cases of explicit or semi-explicit upgrading.235 In all other cases 
with predicate violations, courts should apply the public-policy aspect 
of unfairness under section 75-1.1, using section 5 doctrine to shape 
their analysis of public policy.236 This approach would offer a number 
of benefits. 
First and foremost, the suggested approach would give courts a 
workable alternative to selective upgrading. Because selective 
upgrading dramatically expands the remedies for a predicate 
violation,237 courts have often avoided selective upgrading, even when 
it might have been justified.238 In addition, courts have insufficient 
tools to help them decide whether to engage in selective upgrading.239 
 
primary basis for” FTC determinations that an act or practice is unfair. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
Unlike the 1980 Statement, however, this statutory limit on the FTC’s ability to rely on 
public policy is unlikely to carry over to section 75-1.1. The legislative history of subsection 
5(n) states expressly that the enactment is not meant to change the interpretation of states’ 
section 5 analogues. See S. REP. NO. 103-130, at 13, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1776, 
1788 (“Sound principles of federalism limit the impact of this section to the FTC only.”). 
The 1980 Statement, in contrast, has no similar history. See Michael M. Greenfield, 
Unfairness Under Section 5 of the FTC Act and Its Impact on State Law, 46 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1869, 1895–1934 (2000) (detailing how states have responded to the 1980 Statement). 
  In a recent illustration of the differences between state unfairness doctrines and 
section 5, a prominent “patent troll” settled claims under New York’s section 5 analogue 
on the same day that the company sued the FTC, asserting that section 5 did not apply to 
its patent-enforcement activities. Compare Assurance of Discontinuance, In re MPHJ 
Tech. Invs., LLC, No. 14-015 (N.Y. Att’y Gen. Jan. 13, 2014), available at 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/FINALAODMPHJ.pdf, with Complaint ¶¶ 139–60, MPHJ 
Tech. Invs., LLC v. FTC, No. 6:14-cv-11-WSS (W.D. Tex. filed Jan. 13, 2014), available at 
http://patentlyo.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/gov.uscourts.txwd.669787.1.0.pdf. 
 235. See supra notes 195–204 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 139–63 and 
accompanying text (discussing the problems in North Carolina selective-upgrading 
doctrine). 
 236. See supra notes 221–34 and accompanying text. 
 237. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-16, -16.1(1) (2013) (allowing treble damages and 
attorney fees for violations of section 75-1.1); see also Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 
2038–41 (discussing the effects of the lucrative remedies for section 75-1.1 claims). 
 238. See, e.g., Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of North Carolina, Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 71, 653 
S.E.2d 393, 399 (2007); Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 67, 529 S.E.2d 
676, 680 (2000); Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), LLC, 199 N.C. App. 163, 171, 681 
S.E.2d 448, 455 (2009); see also supra notes 104–11, 141–60 (discussing the analysis in these 
decisions). 
 239. For example, in Walker, the Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded that 
violations of licensing regulations generally, and even violations of the licensing statutes at 
issue, would not support selective upgrading. See 362 N.C. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 298–99. 
The court, however, gave only limited reasons for these conclusions. See id., quoted supra 
text accompanying note 69. 
CITE AS 92 N.C. L. REV. 1881 (2014) 
2014] PER SE UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES  1929 
 
This lack of tools has led courts to create unexplained new theories—
the near relatives—to justify rulings without adopting approaches that 
seem too absolute.240 
The public-policy approach would address the root cause of 
these problems: a lack of standards.241 As the FTC’s 1980 Statement 
on unfairness illustrates, there is thoughtful jurisprudence on 
unfairness standards under section 5.242 Indeed, this jurisprudence is 
constantly being expanded by new decisions and new scholarship.243 
Given how difficult it is for courts to create upgrading standards out 
 
 240. See supra notes 93–138 and accompanying text (discussing the near relatives and 
their role as coping mechanisms). 
 241. See supra notes 139–63 and accompanying text. 
  A few states have created upgrading standards by adopting statutes or regulations 
on upgrading itself. See FLA. STAT. § 501.203 (2013); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 04.02.01.033 
(2013); 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.16 (1994); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 15, § 60-8.090 
(2011). There is no indication, however, that the legislature or any state agency in North 
Carolina is poised to do the same. 
 242. See, e.g., Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 2056–64 (discussing this 
jurisprudence); cf. Calkins, supra note 225, at 1942 n.27 (“The FTC is, if anything, over-
studied . . . .”). 
 243. For example, when the FTC approved a recent consent decree with Apple, the 
commissioners debated whether the unfairness criteria in the 1980 Statement were 
violated by an undisclosed App Store feature that allowed users to avoid reentering their 
passwords on a strict transaction-by-transaction basis—a feature that allowed some 
children to make unauthorized purchases. Compare Statement of Chairwoman Ramirez 
and Commissioner Brill at 3, Apple Inc., No. 1123018 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Jan. 15, 2014), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/140115applestatement 
ramirezbrill.pdf (reasoning that Apple’s failure to disclose this feature caused a substantial 
consumer injury in an absolute sense), with Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Wright 
at 11–16, Apple Inc., available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/ 
140115applestatementwright_0.pdf (reasoning that Apple’s failure to disclose the feature 
was not unfair because, among other points, the nondisclosure offered some users 
increased convenience that outweighed the injuries that the nondisclosure caused for 
other users). 
  In another example that shows the rigor of unfairness decisions under section 5, a 
federal court ruled that consumers and businesses whose credit information was stolen 
from the computers of Wyndham hotels could suffer a substantial injury even if federal 
statutes and the practices of most credit-card issuers would shield those consumers and 
businesses from any unauthorized charges. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 2:13-
CV-1887, 2014 WL 1349019, at *15–18 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2014), petition for leave to appeal 
granted, No. 14-8091 (3d Cir. July 29, 2014). 
  Even so, some scholars argue that individual decisions and consent decrees like 
these offer too little guidance to businesses. This scholarship urges the FTC to make 
further policy statements that would expand on the 1980 Statement, especially in difficult 
areas like data security. See, e.g., GEOFFREY A. MANNE, HUMILITY, INSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRAINTS AND ECONOMIC RIGOR: LIMITING THE FTC’S DISCRETION 35–37 (2014), 
available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
Supplemental-Testimony-Manne-CMT-FTC-100-Academic-Perspective-2014-2-28.pdf. If 
the FTC responds to these suggestions, the resulting guidelines will add further to the 
materials that courts can use to help them apply section 75-1.1. 
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of whole cloth,244 courts would benefit from using authorities on 
public policy under section 5 to decide which predicate violations 
justify liability under section 75-1.1.245 
Second, driving selective-upgrading cases into the public-policy 
aspect of unfairness would help courts refine the public-policy 
analysis itself. As noted above, few North Carolina decisions apply 
the public-policy aspect of unfairness.246 If courts used the public-
policy analysis to decide cases in which litigants rely on external 
standards, this “game pressure” would probably lead courts to 
analyze public policy more thoroughly.247 Over time, by asking 
whether predicate violations reflect unambiguous conclusions of 
unjustified injuries,248 the courts could achieve a more predictable 
relationship between predicate violations and section 75-1.1. 
Third, limiting per se violations to cases of explicit or semi-
explicit upgrading will give the General Assembly an incentive to 
decide the scope of per se liability expressly. In recent years, the 
legislature has enacted a number of statements that a violation of a 
given statute is also a violation of section 75-1.1.249 If courts ended 
selective upgrading, eliminated the near relatives of per se violations, 
and began analyzing the public-policy basis of predicate violations,250 
the General Assembly might well engage in explicit upgrading more 
often. At a minimum, the legislature would know the courts’ 
approach to upgrading, so it would have a clear foundation on which 
to build new law on the scope of section 75-1.1.251 
 
 244. See, e.g., Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), LLC, 199 N.C. App. 163, 170, 681 
S.E.2d 448, 454 (2009) (illustrating these difficulties). 
 245. See, e.g., Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 4, at 2072–78 (discussing the benefits of 
using section 5 doctrine to shape other aspects of the unfairness doctrine under section 75-
1.1). 
 246. See supra notes 208–20 and accompanying text. 
 247. The Associated Press, Duke Ends Tech’s Season with 82-70 Victory, 
ACCESSNORTHGA.COM (Mar. 14, 2008, 10:15 PM), http://www.accessnorthga.com/ 
detail.php?n=208012&c=5 (quoting Duke University basketball coach Mike Krzyzewski’s 
use of the term “game pressure” to describe the prospect that one’s actions will decide the 
outcome of a game); supra notes 206–18 and accompanying text (noting that most public-
policy cases to date contain only conclusory analysis). 
 248. See supra notes 223–32 and accompanying text. 
 249. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47H-8 (2013) (enacted 2010); id. § 14-344.2 (enacted 
2008); id. § 66-67.5 (enacted 2007); id. § 66-356 (enacted 2006); id. § 75-38 (enacted 2003). 
 250. See supra notes 195–234 and accompanying text. 
 251. The General Assembly has a history of responding to significant changes in the 
case law under section 75-1.1. The most notable response occurred after the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina decided, in State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 
311, 320, 233 S.E.2d 895, 901 (1977), that section 75-1.1 did not cover debt-collection 
practices. Within the same year, the legislature enacted subsection 75-1.1(b), which states 
that, except for certain express exclusions, section 75-1.1 covers “all business activities, 
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D. Examples of How the Proposed Analysis Would Affect North 
Carolina Decisions 
If courts limit per se violations of section 75-1.1 to cases of 
explicit or semi-explicit upgrading and replace selective upgrading 
with the unfairness doctrine, those changes will affect the outcome of 
some, but not all, section 75-1.1 cases. 
For example, under the approach proposed here, Walker252 
would produce a per se violation, not the rejection of one. In the 
predicate regulations at issue in Walker, the types of conduct that 
occurred in that case are specifically described as “unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices.”253 Likewise, the predicate statute in Walker allows a 
regulatory agency to deny, suspend, or revoke licenses when licensees 
“commit[] unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”254 
In light of these express references to unfair or deceptive 
conduct, the Supreme Court of North Carolina could have decided 
the case by applying semi-explicit upgrading, instead of rejecting 
selective upgrading.255 If not for the pressures of selective upgrading, 
the court would not have needed to decide that a violation of a 
licensing regulation or a “regulatory statute” fails to state a per se 
violation of section 75-1.1.256 The textual connection between the 
predicate violations and unfair or deceptive practices would have 
prevailed over the fact that the predicate violations were 
“regulatory.”257 
 
however denominated.” Act of June 27, 1977, ch. 747, § 2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 984, 984 
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b)); see also Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
300 N.C. 247, 261 n.5, 266 S.E.2d 610, 620 n.5 (1980) (noting that this statutory amendment 
occurred “in the wake of our decision in Penney”), overruled on other grounds by Myers & 
Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 323 N.C. 559, 374 S.E.2d 385 (1988). 
 252. Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 653 S.E.2d 393 (2007); see 
supra notes 58–80 and accompanying text (discussing the key reasoning in Walker). 
 253. 11 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 8.0907 (2014); see Walker, 362 N.C. at 69, 653 S.E.2d at 398 
(quoting the jury’s findings, which tracked the wording of 11 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 
8.0907(1)–(4)). 
 254. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-143.13(a)(7); see Walker, 362 N.C. at 69–70, 653 S.E.2d at 
398 (quoting trial court’s judgment, which referred to this statute). 
 255. See Walker, 362 N.C. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 398–99 (considering and rejecting 
selective upgrading), quoted supra in text accompanying note 69. 
 256. Id. at 70, 653 S.E.2d at 398; see id. at 70–71, 653 S.E.2d at 398–99; see also supra 
notes 196–98 and accompanying text (discussing the high stakes of selective upgrading). 
 257. Walker, 362 N.C. at 70, 71, 653 S.E.2d at 398, 399. Indeed, in Gray and Winston 
Realty, the court had already rejected the argument that other statutes cannot support 
liability under section 75-1.1 because those statutes contemplate regulation by an 
administrative agency. See Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 71, 529 
S.E.2d 676, 683 (2000) (“Although N.C.G.S. § 58-63-15(11) does regulate settlement 
claims in the insurance industry, insurance companies are not immune to the general 
principles and provisions of [section] 75-1.1.”); Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 
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In contrast, if the courts adopted the analysis proposed here, the 
relationship between common-law fraud and section 75-1.1 would 
change in form, but not in substance.258 As a nonstatutory theory, 
fraud has no text that could support explicit or semi-explicit 
upgrading.259 Thus, under the analysis proposed here, courts would 
apply the public-policy aspect of unfairness under section 75-1.1. 
They would ask whether fraud is convincingly recognized as offering 
unambiguous evidence of unjustified injury to consumers.260 
Courts would surely answer yes to this question. As the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina has recognized, the General Assembly 
enacted section 75-1.1 to make it easier for customers to recover for 
fraud and other deceptive conduct.261 Likewise, fraud and other forms 
of deception are the main concern that led to the enactment of similar 
statutes in other states262 and the “deceptive acts or practices” aspect 
of section 5.263 
As this history shows, preventing fraud is a widely shared public 
policy—the type of policy that courts are likely to enforce through the 
unfairness doctrine under section 75-1.1.264 Thus, under the analysis 
proposed here, fraud will no longer be a per se violation of section 75-
1.1, but it will violate the statute nonetheless. 
 
N.C. 90, 97, 331 S.E.2d 677, 681 (1985) (rejecting the arguments that section 75-1.1 could 
not apply because the predicate statute was “regulatory in nature” and that “the authority 
to enforce the [statute] rests with the Commissioner of Labor”). 
 258. See, e.g., Kettle v. Leonard, No. 7:11-CV-189-BR, 2012 WL 4086595, at *12–13 
(E.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 2012); Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 309, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975). 
But cf. Keister v. Nat’l Council of the Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of the U.S., No. 12 
CVS 1137, 2013 WL 3864583, at *3 (N.C. Bus. Ct. July 18, 2013) (“Fraud or 
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E. Possible Objections to the Suggested Approach 
One might respond that the approach proposed in this Article 
would not be better than selective upgrading and its near relatives.265 
The predicted objections, however, are unpersuasive. 
First, one might object that limiting per se violations to instances 
of explicit or semi-explicit upgrading is too restrictive—i.e., that 
courts should continue to engage in selective upgrading in some cases. 
Under the approach proposed here, however, courts would still have 
options for finding a violation of section 75-1.1 in the absence of 
express statutory language. For example, they could apply the public-
policy aspect of unfairness.266 They could also decide that a 
defendant’s conduct satisfies another part of the standards for 
unfairness or deception.267 The difference would be that courts would 
not face the daunting challenges posed by selective upgrading.268 
Second, one might say that this Article proposes to replace a 
single-stroke analysis—a decision that all instances of a particular 
predicate violation do or do not satisfy the conduct standard under 
section 75-1.1—with a less categorical analysis.269 That is true, but 
courts are already hesitating to engage in the single-stroke analysis. 
By crafting less categorical alternatives to selective upgrading—the 
near relatives—courts have shown that they see the categorical nature 
of selective upgrading as a problem, not as a desirable feature.270 
Finally, one might argue that replacing selective upgrading with 
the public-policy aspect of unfairness would replace one nebulous 
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analysis with another. To be sure, the FTC’s criteria for public-policy-
based unfairness require judgment calls.271 Even so, these criteria are 
better defined than the current North Carolina criteria for selective 
upgrading. North Carolina decisions, after all, do not expressly state 
criteria for selective upgrading; one has to distill the criteria from a 
group of opinions.272 If courts consult the FTC’s criteria for public-
policy-based unfairness, they will find standards that at least begin to 
solve this problem.273 Further, a court that applies the FTC standards 
can take guidance from explicit decisions of courts and the FTC, as 
well as thoughtful commentary, on the public-policy aspect of 
unfairness.274 
CONCLUSION 
Per se violations of section 75-1.1 have powerful effects across 
entire categories of conduct. For good reason, courts have become 
reluctant to create these effects without legislative endorsement. The 
multiple theories that courts have used to express this reluctance, 
however, have created a morass. 
Courts can begin to find their way out of this morass by avoiding 
ambiguous language like “as a matter of law” and “may be.” They 
can improve things further by avoiding the near relatives of per se 
violations. The near relatives might have allowed a compromise in 
past cases, but they have given today’s courts a confusing menu of 
standards for deciding the role of predicate violations. Finally, by 
limiting per se violations to those that the General Assembly has 
explicitly recognized, and by applying the public-policy aspect of 
unfairness in all other cases, the courts can end their struggle with 
selective upgrading. 
As a group, these changes will make the law under section 75-1.1 
more stable, rigorous, and predictable. 
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